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SUPREME COURT'S GISSEL DECISION
Laura Cooper*
The National Labor Relations Act created the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) and vested the Board with two principal respon-
sibilities. First, the NLRB is responsible for conducting secret ballot
elections among employees to ascertain whether they desire a collective
bargaining representative.' Second, the NLRB is responsible for reme-
dying unfair labor practices.2 These dual responsibilities, protection of
employee free choice and remediation of unfair labor practices, may
conflict when the Board is asked to provide a remedy for unfair labor
practices that occur during the course of a union representation elec-
tion campaign. The Board has been concerned that where an employer
engages in serious and pervasive unfair labor practices during an elec-
tion campaign, the employees may become so intimidated that a secret
ballot election could not determine accurately the employees' senti-
ments regarding union representation.- The Board has claimed the au-
thority to require an employer to recognize and bargain with a union as
the representative of its employees where the union, at some time in the
past, has demonstrated support by a majority of employees, in the form
of signed union authorization cards, and where the employer has com-
mitted serious unfair labor practices that would make holding a fair
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Data collection and analysis for
this article were funded by a grant from the Walter G. Meyer Research Program of the American
Bar Foundation. Law student research assistants Margaret Rossing and Linda Taylor contributed
to the collection of data. Professor Sanford Weisberg, Department of Applied Statistics, Univer-
sity of Minnesota served as statistical consultant. The author gratefully acknowledges the assist-
ance of the staff of Region 18 of the National Labor Relations Board and particularly the
cooperation of former Regional Director Robert Wilson and Regional Attorney Herbert
Dawidoff. Professor Barry Feld of the University of Minnesota and Professor Julius Getman of
Yale University provided invaluable encouragement and advice from the inception of the project.
I National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as NLRA], § 9(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I)
(1982).
2 NLRA, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
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election impossible. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company,3 the
Supreme Court found the Board's issuance of such bargaining orders to
be within the NLRB's statutory authority.
The assumption that underlies the Board's bargaining remedy, af-
firmed in Gissel, is that signed union authorization cards can provide a
reasonably accurate demonstration of the extent of success that a union
would have had in an election conducted by the NLRB in the absence
of unfair labor practices. The central purpose of this Article is to assess
empirically the validity of that assumption. This Article briefly out-
lines the Board's procedures for the conduct of elections and the
remediation of unfair labor practices, reviews the legal background and
subsequent history of the Supreme Court's Gissel decision, and de-
scribes prior empirical studies of election behavior. Next, the Article
outlines the methodology used here to study empirically the factual as-
sumption behind Gissel bargaining orders, reports the results of that
study, and discusses possible changes in NLRB policy responsive to
those results. In the process of collecting and analyzing data in order to
evaluate the Gissel assumption, additional information was collected
about factors other than authorization cards that might affect the out-
come of union representation elections. Therefore the Article also dis-
cusses the impact upon elections of a variety of other factors including




A union representation campaign typically begins when a union
organizer or an employee of a company solicits employee signatures on
authorization cards. In signing an authorization card, an employee in-
dicates a desire to have the designated union as a representative in col-
lective bargaining with the employer.4 Except in rare circumstances, a
petition from a union or employees requesting the NLRB to conduct a
secret ballot election must be accompanied by authorization cards from
at least thirty percent of the employees. 5 Following receipt of the peti-
tion at a regional Board office, an agent of the NLRB investigates the
petition to ascertain whether the case comes within the Board's juris-
diction, whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate, and
whether the union has submitted a sufficient number of authorization
3 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1983).
5 Id § 101.18(a). The NLRA also permits an employer to file an election petition if a labor
organization has requested recognition as a collective bargaining representative. NLRA,
§ 9(c)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1982). Employer petitions do not require a showing of
employee support. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983).
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cards. 6 If it is appropriate to proceed, the Board agent seeks to obtain
an agreement between the employer and the union on the details of the
election, including a description of the bargaining unit and the date of
the election.7 In more than eighty percent of the cases in which an
election is conducted, the terms of the election are resolved by agree-
ment of the parties.8 Where an agreement is not reached, a. formal
hearing is held, which is conducted by a Board agent in a nonadver-
sarial manner.9 The regional director of the Board decides various pre-
election issues on the basis of the record of the hearing and, where
appropriate, orders that the election be held on a specific date and
within a specified bargaining unit.' 0 An election generally is conducted
within thirty days of the order." Campaigning, usually commenced
before a petition is filed, is continued during this period and may take
the form of speeches, individual solicitation, or the distribution of writ-
ten material.12 At the date and time determined by the election agree-
ment or Board order, an election is held under the direction of a Board
agent. 13 Elections are almost invariably conducted at the workplace
during working hours. 14 Ballots are marked in the secrecy of a voting
6 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983). Congress authorized the five-member National Labor Rela-
tions Board [NLRB] in Washington to delegate its election responsibilities to regional directors.
NLRA, § 3(b), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982). That delegation was accomplished in 1961 by the pro-
mulgation of what is now 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(a) (1983).
7 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1983).
8 See 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 15 (1980).
9 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (1983).
10 Id § 101.21(a). There is a limited right to review the order of a regional director by the
NLRB's five-member Board in Washington, D.C. 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(b) (1983). In fiscal year
1980, when more than thirteen thousand petitions for election related matters were filed nation-
wide, the five-member Board issued election orders in only 38 cases. See 45 NLRB ANN. Rtp. 15
(1980).
11 A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw-CASES AND MATERIALS 309 (9th ed. 1981).
12 Employees are permitted to discuss organization at the workplace during nonworking time
and to distribute literature in nonworking areas at their place of employment. Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Nonemployee organizers usually may be denied access to the
workplace. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956). Employers are required to
furnish the union with a list of the names and addresses of employees within seven days of the
direction of an election. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Excelsior Under-
wear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40 (1966). An employer generally is free to make noncoercive
speeches during working hours without affording the union any comparable opportunity. NLRB
v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958). One empirical study of union elections found that
92% of employees received written material from their employer and 85% received such material
from the union. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY 90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. GETMAN STUDY]. In campaigns in which
meetings were held, 83% of employees attended a company meeting, while only 36% attended a
union meeting. Id at 92. Only 24% of voters were contacted personally by a union representative
and only 14% were contacted by a company representative. Id at 93-94.
13 29 C.F.R. § 101.19(a)(2) (1983).
14 Elections are held on the employer's premises "in the absence of good cause to the con-
trary." OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NLRB, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
REPRESENTATION CASES 276 (1974). Mail balloting is used only in unusual circumstances in
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booth.'5 Customarily, the Board agent tallies the ballots and reports
the results immediately upon the conclusion of the balloting. 16
Parties to the election may file objections to the election, which
may concern unlawful campaigning or irregularities in balloting, and
may challenge the eligibility of individual voters.17 Challenges or ob-
jections to the election are resolved by the regional office through in-
vestigation and, in some instances, by hearing. 18 Unless waived by a
pre-election agreement, the parties also have the right to limited review
of the regional director's post-election decisions by the NLRB in Wash-
ington.' 9 The regional director has the authority, in response to objec-
tions, to set aside the results of the election and order a new election if
the election campaign and balloting failed to satisfy the Board's desire
to provide "conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees. '20 While conduct that does not
rise to the level of an unfair labor practice may be the basis for setting
aside an election, an employer unfair labor practice during the cam-
paign will cause the Board to set the election aside unless it is virtually
impossible to conclude that the violation affected the results of the elec-
tion.21 In the absence of post-election objections, or following their res-
olution, the regional director issues a certification of the results of the
election, and, where a majority of the employees have voted for the
union, the regional director certifies the labor organization as the exclu-
sive collective bargaining representative of the employees. 22 These or-
ders of the regional director are also subject to limited review by the
five-member Board. Decisions of the Board on election matters are not
which long distances are involved or in which eligible voters are scattered because of their duties.
Id at 277.
15 29 C.F.R. § 101.19(a)(2) (1983).
16 Id § 101.19(a)(3).
17 Id § 101.19(a)(4).
18 29 C.F.R. § 101.21(c) (1983).
19 Id § 101.21(d).
20 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). Except in extraordinary circumstances,
only events following the filing of an election petition are considered by the Board in deciding
whether to set aside the results of an election. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 453
(1962); Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961).
21 In Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786 (1962), the Board held that conduct that
violates the Act "is, a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and untram-
meled choice in an election." The Board subsequently noted one recognized exception to this
policy; where "it is virtually impossible to conclude that. . .[the violations] could have affected
the results of the election." Super Thrift Markets, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 409, 409 (1977). This excep-
tion was applied in a case in which a single employee had been threatened with discharge, but
there was no evidence that this information was disseminated to any of the other 850 employees in
the unit, working at five different locations. Caron Int'l., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1979). In the
latter case, two members of the Board dissented on the ground that the Board should not presume
lack of dissemination and that the majority's application of the Super Thrift rule in such cases
would result in "the exception swallowing the rule." Id at 1122.
22 29 C.F.R. § 101.19(a)(6) (1983).
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directly subject to judicial review, but may be considered by the federal
courts of appeals in conjunction with judicial review of an unfair labor
practice proceeding, most commonly an employer's refusal to bargain
with the union in order to test the validity of the election proceedings.23
B. Unfair Labor Practice Procedures
The National Labor Relations Act defines the types of conduct
that will be considered unfair. labor practices24 and empowers the
NLRB to prevent persons from engaging in such practices.25 The Act
also permits the Board to define other unfair labor practices through
interpretation of the broadly phrased statutory language that makes it
an unfair labor practice to interfere with the rights of employees. 26 The
sorts of conduct during the course of a union representation election
campaign that would be considered unfair labor practices include dis-
charges of, or other discrimination against, employees because of their
union activities,27 coercive interrogation of employees regarding union
sentiments, 28 promises of or grants of benefits to employees for the pur-
pose of persuading them to vote against the union,29 threats of retalia-
tion for union support, such as a threat to close a plant if a union
should win the election,30 and interference with employees' abilities to
engage in reasonable campaign activities.3 ' Once a union has been se-
lected as the employees' collective bargaining representative, it is an
unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse to bargain with the
union or to fail to bargain in good faith.32
23 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); NLRA, § 9(d), 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1982); NLRA,
§ 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
24 NLRA, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Section 8(a) of the Act outlines conduct that would
constitute an unfair labor practice if committed by an employer;, section 8(b) defines unfair union
labor practices. The scope of this Article makes it appropriate to limit discussion to charges
against employers.
25 NLRA, § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
26 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" in section 7. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
27 NLRA, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). Section 8(a)(3) makes it a violation "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... "
28 Polling that fails to meet certain conditions, including secrecy, has been found to be a viola-
tion of§ 8(a)(1) of the Act. See supra note 26. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
29 NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
30 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-20 (1969).
31 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
32 NLRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982); NLRA, § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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The NLRB takes no role in the initiation of unfair labor practices
charges. Charges against employers are filed in NLRB regional offices
by unions or by individuals. NLRB agents then investigate the charge
to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the Act has
been violated.33 If the regional director finds the charge to be without
merit, it is dismissed if not withdrawn by the charging party.34 In cases
found to have merit, efforts are made toward settlement, both before
and after a complaint is issued.35 If settlement efforts are unsuccessful,
a formal hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.36 If the
unfair labor practice complaint is based on conduct that also forms the
basis of objections to an election, the regional director orders the objec-
tions and complaint to be consolidated for hearing before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge.37 If a party is dissatisfied with the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge, review is available from the five-member
Board.38 Decisions of the Board are not self-executing but rather are
effectuated through enforcement by the federal courts of appeals. The
Board may seek enforcement of its orders by petitioning the court of
appeals. 39 In addition, any party aggrieved by a final order of the
Board may seek judicial review.40 The Act also authorizes the Board to
request injunctive relief in a federal district court at any time following
the issu'nce of a complaint,4' but such requests are rarely made.42
The Act defines the remedial authority of the Board, and, where
the Board finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed, di-
rects it to order the person "to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
. . . [the] Act."' 43 Under this authority, the Board is able to provide
remedies tailored to the particular unfair labor practice committed, and
most commonly orders the employer to cease the specific practice upon
33 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1980).
34 Id
35 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.7, 101.9 (1983). Through the processes of dismissal, withdrawal, and set-
tlement, more than 90% of the unfair labor practice cases filed with the Board's field offices are
resolved without any formal hearing in a median of 40 days. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 9 (1980). In
fiscal 1980, the regional directors considered 39% of the charges against employers as meritorious.
Id. at I0.
36 45 NLRB Ann. Rep. 9 (1980).
37 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASE HANDLING MANUAL (PART Two), REPRESEN-
TATIO:N PROCEEDINGS, 11420.1-.2 (1978); 29 C.F.R. § 102.33 (1983).
38 29 C.F.R. § 102.33 (1983).
39 NLRA, § 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
40 Id § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
41 Id § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 1600).
42 In fiscal 1980, regional offices found more than 12,000 charges nationwide against employ-
ers to be meritorious. The Board, however, sought injunctions against employers in only 45 cases.
See 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 9, 10, 205 (1980).
43 NLRA, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
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which the complaint was based. Where serious unfair labor practices
have been committed in the context of a union representation election
campaign, however, it has been the Board's position that its authority
to order an employer, for example, to cease threatening employees, or
to cease discharging additional employees for anti-union motivations,
cannot always restore the atmosphere of free choice that it believes is
vital to the conduct of a union representation election. It is this belief
that motivated the Board to introduce the additional remedy of order-
ing an employer whose unfair labor practices had precluded holding a
fair election to recognize and bargain with a union although that union
had never demonstrated in an election that it actually had the support
of a majority of the employees. The next section will address the gene-
sis and application of these Gissel bargaining orders.
II. GIssEL BARGAINING ORDERS
A. Origins of the Doctrine
The NLRB's policy of issuing bargaining orders as a remedy for
outrageous unfair labor practices committed in the course of an elec-
tion campaign, which emerged during the Supreme Court's considera-
tion of the Gisse144 case, was only a slight variation from the policy that
the agency had always had toward achievement of representative status
through the use of authorization cards. Almost as soon as the National
Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935, the Board permitted a union
to gain status as the exclusive collective bargaining representative by
means other than winning a representation election conducted by the
NLRB. 45 A traditional means for a union to gain representative status
had been to obtain cards signed by a majority of the employees, au-
thorizing the union to represent them for collective bargaining pur-
poses.46 A union with cards from a majority of employees could gain
representative status in one of two ways. First, the employer might rec-
ognize the union voluntarily and bargain with it in the absence of an
election.47 Second, under the Board's Joy Silk48 doctrine, if an em-
ployer in bad faith declined to recognize a union that presented to it
evidence of a card majority, the employer could be found to have com-
mitted the unfair labor practice of failing to recognize the union, and,
as a remedy, be ordered to bargain. One of the means by which the
Board had traditionally demonstrated an employer's lack of a good
faith doubt of the union's majority status was by proving that the em-
44 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
45 Id at 596-97.
46 Id at 597.
47 R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
40 (1976).
48 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See
also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 592-93.
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ployer had committed unfair labor practices in an effort to undermine
the union.49
In the NLRB's briefs to the Supreme Court for the four cases that
were consolidated in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the agency sought to
demonstrate how, in each case, the employer's unfair labor practices
evidenced its lack of good faith so as to warrant a bargaining order
under the Joy Silk doctrine.50 At the oral argument in Gissel, however,
the Board appeared to abandon the good faith doubt test of Joy Silk
and adopt a policy of issuing a bargaining.order only upon "the com-
mission of serious unfair labor practices that interfere with the election
processes and tend to preclude the holding of a fair election."5' The
employer's subjective motivation in declining to recognize the union
would no longer be at issue.5 2 Although the Board's bargaining orders
in the four consolidated cases had been based on the "good faith" test,
the agency had relied in each instance on findings that the employer's
bad faith had been evidenced by unfair labor practices that made hold-
ing a fair election impossible.5 3 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Board's findings that in each of the cases there were unfair labor prac-
49 Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949). Under Joy Silk, an employer could also
be found to lack good faith if it gave no reasons for having rejected the bargaining demand.
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 593 (1969). In Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077
(1966), the Board changed its position and relieved the employer of any burden to come forward
with reasons for rejecting the bargaining demand. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 593.
Under.Aaron Brothers, bad faith could also be proved by an employer's "course of conduct," even
if it did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. at 1079.
50 In Gissel, employees were interrogated about union activities, promised better benefits,
threatened with reprisals, subjected to surveillance at union meetings, and, in two cases, were
subjected to reduced working hours and, later, discharged for union activities. Brief for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board at 44-45, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The
Board concluded:
Unfair labor practices of the kind engaged in by the Company would tend to undermine the
clear majority which the union had originally attained, and warranted the inference that the
Company's refusal to bargain was improperly motivated. In these circumstances, a Board
election would not reflect a true picture of employee sentiment.
Id at 47. Unfair labor practices were also used as evidence of bad faith in Heck's, Id at 48-49, 50,
in General Steel, id at 52-53; and in Sinclair, Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 13,
Sinclair Company v. NLRB, decidedsub norm. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
51 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 594. The Supreme Court opinion states that "the
Board announced at oral argument that it had virtually abandoned the Joy Silk doctrine alto-
gether." Id. In fact, counsel for the Board, in answer to a question from the bench, responded
that the rule he was articulating at oral argument was not a change in policy, but was rather a
restatement of the Board's policy articulated in the Aaron Brothers case. Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 21-22, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 575. The holding of Aaron Brothers is
summarized supra note 49. In response to repeated additional questions from the bench posing
hypothetical situations, however, counsel for the Board concurred in the Justices' restatements of
the Board's position that eliminated the "good faith doubt" nomenclature. Id at 22-23, NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 575.
52 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 594.
53 See supra note 50.
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tices that would tend to preclude the holding of a fair election.54
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion also considered whether
the National Labor Relations Act permits unions to use mechanisms
other than elections to gain representative status, whether authorization
cards are intrinsically unreliable, and whether the statute permits issu-
ing a bargaining order as a remedy for the commission of unfair labor
practices. The Court reviewed the Act's language and legislative his-
tory and concluded that neither the original Act nor its 1947 amend-
ments limit an employer's duty to recognize and bargain with a union
to those unions whose representative status had been certified through
a Board-conducted election.55
In considering whether authorization cards are sufficiently reliable
to serve as one of these alternative means for achieving representative
status, the Court perceived two objections to card reliability. First, the
argument was made that cards could not accurately reflect employees'
desires, either because the cards were signed without the benefit of full
information before an employer had had an opportunity to present its
views or because the card signing was the result of group pressures and
would not reflect the sort of individual decision made in the privacy of
a voting booth.5 6 Second, it was asserted that cards were frequently
obtained through misrepresentation and coercion.5 7
The Court did not entirely discredit these objections to authoriza-
tion cards. It acknowledged, as did the Board, that elections are a pre-
ferred and superior method for ascertaining whether a union possesses
majority support.5 8 What concerned the Court was that, if cards were
considered totally invalid, there appeared to be no means to protect
employee choice in a situation in which an employer had engaged in
conduct that had disrupted the election process. The Court expressed
its fear that in the absence of the availability of a bargaining order
remedy, "an employer could put off his bargaining obligation indefi-
nitely through continuing interference with elections."'59 The Court
concluded that authorization cards could "adequately reflect employee
sentiment" when the election process had been impeded.60 It re-
sponded to the argument that the employees lacked exposure to em-
ployer opinion by asserting that unions would usually inform
employers of the campaign early in the organizational drive.6' The
54 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 595.
55 Id at 595-600.
56 Id at 602.
57 Id
58 Id
59 Id at 603.
60 Id
61 Id The Court assumed that unions would want to make sure that employers knew of the
existence of the card signing campaign so that, if employees involved in the union drive were
thereafter disciplined, there would be no difficulty in proving employer knowledge of union activ-
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Court noted that in three of the cases before it the employer had been
informed at the outset of the organizational campaign and that in the
fourth case the employer had had a chance to deliver a speech before
the union obtained cards from a majority of the employees. 62 Minimiz-
ing the impact of group pressures as a reason to consider the cards less
reliable than election results, the Court suggested that group pressures
would be equally present in elections, which are usually held in small
units, in which the sentiment of voters can be individually canvassed. 63
In response to the argument that cards might be signed in an atmos-
phere of misrepresentation and coercion, the Court stated that the
Board had adequate means available to police irregularities in those
instances in which they actually occurred. 64
After dismissing these objections to the reliability of authorization
cards for demonstrating majority support, the Court turned to the final
question of whether a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy where
an employer has committed unfair labor practices that would make a
fair election unlikely or that caused an election to be set aside. The
Court again noted the danger that limiting the Board to rerun elections
would reward employers for unlawful conduct by permitting them to
avoid any bargaining obligation indefinitely.65 The Court also sug-
gested thzet employees' "true, undistorted desires" could not adequately
be reflected in a rerun election tainted by an employer's prior unlawful
conduct.66 The bargaining order remedy was therefore justified as a
way to deter employer misconduct as well as to effectuate "ascertain-
able employee free choice," which had been manifested by an authori-
zation card majority.67 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
unanimous Court, concluded:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past prac-
ity as an element in proving that the discipline was illegally motivated. A text for union or-
ganizers does advise them to notify the employer for this reason. S. SCHLOSSBERG & J. SCOTT,
ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 66 (3d. ed. 1983). In one empirical study covering 18 elections, how-
ever, researchers found only four in which nearly all cards were signed after employer knowledge
of the campaign. J. GETMAN STUDY; supra note 12, at 135.
62 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 603.
63 Id at 604.
64 Id at 602-03. The Court in Gissel rejected as "endless and unreliable" any test of the
validity of cards that would entail a probe of the employees' subjective motivations. Id at 608.
Rather, the Court expressed approval of the Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine, under which
cards are considered the unacceptable product of misrepresentation if they were solicited by an
assertion that they would be used only to get an election. Id at 608-09; Cumberland Shoe Corp.,
144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
65 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 610-11.
66 Id at 611. The Court cited an empirical study of 267 rerun elections that found that more
than 30% of them were won by the party that caused the election to be set aside. Pollitt, NLRB Re-
Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209, 212 (1963), cited in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. at 611 n.31.
67 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 614.
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tices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of tradi-
tional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment
once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a
bargaining order, then such a bargaining order should issue.68
The tone of the Supreme Court's opinion in Gissel suggests that
the Court viewed the bargaining order remedy, not as exceptional or
extraordinary, but rather as merely another remedy available to the
Board when it appeared preferable to other remedies for unfair labor
practices. The Court noted that the bargaining remedy should be used
even where other remedies might work, so long as the bargaining order
would "on balance" provide better protection for employees. 69 The
Court also minimized the significance of bargaining orders by noting
that there was "nothing permanent" in such an order because the em-
ployees could, after the effects of an employer's unfair labor practices
had dissipated, disavow the union.70 Further, it declined to accept the
characterization of the Fourth Circuit and the employers, that, in the
great majority of cases in which unfair labor practices had been com-
mitted, a cease and desist order and posted notices would make a bar-
gaining order remedy unnecessary. 7' Rather, the Court emphasized
that bargaining orders fall within the Act's delegation of broad, discre-
tionary remedial authority to the Board and that in view of the Board's
"fund of knowledge and expertise... its choice of remedy must...
be given special respect by reviewing courts." 72
The Court's treatment of the Board's orders in the four cases con-
68 Id at 614-15.
69 Id The full quotation is set out supra text accompanying note 68. Two members of the
Supreme Court recently stated their view that Gissel bargaining orders should not be sanctioned
without a finding of special circumstances that would preclude the use of traditional remedies.
John Cuneo, Inc. v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 1178, 1179-80 (1983) (dissent to denial of certiorari) (Rehn-
quist, J., joined by Powell, J.).
70 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 613. The NLRA authorizes the NLRB, upon
receipt of a petition, to conduct a decertification election in which employees are permitted to vote
on whether they desire continued representation by their present collective bargaining agent.
NLRA, § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (l)(A)(ii) (1982).
71 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 612 n.32. The employers' argument was based on
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562,
570 (4th Cir. 1967).
72 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 612 n.32. The Court continued: "'[I]t is usually
better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the
agency.' Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)". The Supreme Court recently repeated the
language from Gissel quoted above in holding that the remedial discretion afforded the Board by
statute permitted it to decline to award an independent contractor reimbursement of dues and
other payments unlawfully obtained by a union. Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983). The
petitioner had argued that the Board failed to explain satisfactorily why a refund had not been
awarded. The Court quoted from Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941),
saying, " 'All we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion
with which Congress has empowered it."' Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. at 350. The Court charac-
terized the Board's language describing its remedy in Shepard as "something less than a model of
precise expository prose," id, yet the Court upheld the Board's remedial order.
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solidated in Gissel further confirmed the limited role that the Court
thought appropriate for judicial review of Board bargaining orders. In
three of the cases, the Board had applied its pre-existing doctrine and
held that the employers lacked a good faith doubt of majority status.
In these cases, therefore, the Board had not evaluated the facts in light
of the new standard for bargaining orders that emerged from the Gissel
proceedings in the Supreme Court. The employers urged the Court to
hold that, on the records before it, any conclusion that the card count
would be a more reliable indication of employees' desires would be
unwarranted.73 The Court rejected this request, stating that the requi-
site findings to support the bargaining orders under the new doctrine
might have been implicit in the Board's decisions, and that it would be
"clearly inappropriate for the court below to make any contrary finding
on its own."74 The Court therefore ordered that the three cases be re-
manded to the Board for proper findings.75 In the fourth case, the
Board had adopted the finding of the Trial Examiner that, even if the
employer had a bona fide doubt of the union's majority status, a bar-
gaining order was necessary because the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices had caused the union to lose support.76 Even though there was
not in this fourth case any explicit finding that a fair election would be
impossible despite the use of traditional remedies, and certainly no pre-
cise explanation from the Board as to why the particular employer ac-
tions would preclude a fair election, the Supreme Court affirmed rather
than remanded the Board's bargaining order here. 77 The Court's dis-
position of these four consolidated cases demonstrates its view that it
was the Board's prerogative to assess when bargaining orders were ap-
propriate, that the Board was not required to detail its full reasoning
process in each case, and that the Board's conclusion, once made, was
entitled to substantial deference from the reviewing court.
In light of the Court's characterization of the bargaining order
remedy as typical and temporary, and its directive to lower courts to
defer to the Board's remedial expertise, one might have expected that
73 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 616. The text of the official reporter, in an appar-
ent typographical error, attributes this argument to the "employees" rather than the employers.
There were no employee parties in the case.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261, 269 (1967). The Trial Examiner's analysis was, in total, as
follows:
[T]he Union represented a clear majority of the journeymen wire weavers when Respondent
began its unlawful campaign directed at destroying that majority. To the extent that the
election revealed a loss of union support thereafter, such loss must be found attributable to
the Respondent's unfair labor practices. Therefore, effectuation of the policies of the Act
would still require such a bargaining order in order properly to remedy Respondent's other
unfair labor practices herein found.
Id (footnote omitted).
77 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 620.
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Board bargaining orders following Gissel would have received ready
affirmation in the courts of appeals. In fact, however, such orders have
provoked widespread hostility and denials of enforcement in the circuit
courts.
B. Enforcement of Gissel Bargaining Orders in the Courts of Appeals
Few of the appellate court decisions subsequent to Gissel adopted
the Supreme Court's view of bargaining orders as commonplace or
granted the Board the remedial deference that the Supreme Court di-
rected.78 For reasons that are not fully articulated in their opinions,
most of the circuit courts have made it exceedingly difficult for the
Board to obtain judicial enforcement of its Gissel bargaining orders.
The reasons that these courts have given for their denials of en-
forcement all seem directly contrary to the Supreme Court's explicit
directives in Gissel. Some circuit decisions demand from the Board a
high,79 and sometimes unachievable,80 level of detail in its articulation
of why specific unfair labor practices could not be remedied by tradi-
tional means. Some decisions have attempted to define for the Board in
general rules what kinds of unfair labor practices justify bargaining or-
ders.8 ' Other decisions merely dispute specific Board findings about
78 Certainly some courts have attempted to observe the Supreme Court's directive to give
deference to the Board's remedial bargaining orders. See, e.g., NLRB v. Digital Paging System,
Inc., 659 F.2d 725,726 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Hitchiner Mfg. Co., 634 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir.
1980); Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1978).
79 E.g., NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247 (1st Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Armor Industries, Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1976); Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484
F.2d 1108, 1118 & n.16 (7th Cir. 1973). In language typical of other courts using the same ap-
proach, the Seventh Circuit in Peerless stated that the Board was required to make a detailed
analysis "assessing the possibility of holding a fair election in terms of any continuing effect of
misconduct, the likelihood of recurring misconduct, and the potential effectiveness of ordinary
remedies." Id at 1118. The requirement of making findings with a high degree of specific detail
appears contrary to the Supreme Court's understanding of the Board's task. See supra text accom-
panying notes 73-75. While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Board might want to take
into account the likely recurrence of employer misconduct, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
at 614, the Court made clear that likely recurrence was not a requirement for a bargaining order
since in many cases "[tihe damage will have been done." Id at 612. The requirement of Peerless
that the Board detail why ordinary remedies would be ineffective also appears contrary to the
Supreme Court's approach. The Court's own catalogue of the Board's alternative remedies, id. at
611-12, indicated that it was well aware of the Board's alternatives, but that it thought them gener-
ally inadequate to remedy election damage. Id at 612.
80 E.g., NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1980); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137,
1150-52 (3d Cir. 1977). InApple Tree and Jamaica Towing, the courts had earlier remanded the
cases to the Board to make specific findings. The Board in each case made additional findings, but
upon a second review the courts refused to enforce the Board's orders on the ground that the
findings were insufficiently specific. In Hedstrom, the Board had made findings, but the court
thought that they were too conclusory.
81 In the widely cited case of NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d at 208, for example, the
court, at considerable length, listed unfair labor practices that could be considered "hallmark"
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the seriousness of particular unfair labor practices or the extent to
which they are likely to have a long-term, coercive effect that would
undermine a subsequent election.82 Still others chastise the Board for
failing to take account of changes in circumstances since the initial
Board hearing that might permit holding a fair election at a later
date.83 In one recent opinion, subsequently withdrawn, a court sought
to create a new requirement that in order for any authorization card to
be counted there must be evidence on the record that the employee who
signed the card read it before signing,84 despite the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Gissel that employees "should be bound by the clear lan-
guage of what they sign"8' 5 and the high Court's explicit rejection of
any requirement that the Board engage in any administratively burden-
some inquiry into the subjective motivations of individual employees.8 6
The inconsistency between the Supreme Court's directives in Gis-
sel and the reasons that the circuit courts have given for nonenforce-
ment of Board bargaining orders suggests that judges denying
enforcement are not stating their actual reasons for nonenforcement.
One judge has described fellow judges who have advanced this type of
rationale for nonenforcement as being engaged in "guerrilla warfare"
against the Supreme Court's Gissel decision.87 Another judge has
boldly suggLsted that the procedural requirements that have resulted in
nonenforcement have been imposed to permit judicial manipulation to
achieve judges' subjective ends.88 While Judge Aldisert directed the
following comments to his own Third Circuit, his message applies as
violations, such as a threat to close a plant, that were so likely to have a lasting inhibitive effect
that no extensive explanation would be required of the Board and listed less serious violations that
must be either numerous or coupled with some other factor intensifying their effect before they
would support a bargaining order. Id at 212-15.
82 Eg., NLRB v. Arrow Molded Plastics, Inc., 653 F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. K
& K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co.,
606 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1979).
83 E.g., NLRB v. Frederick's Foodland, Inc., 655 F.2d 88, 90 (6th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Ja-
maica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d at 216; Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 510
(7th Cir. 1980). See also Note, "After411, Tomorrow is Another Day" Should Subsequent Events
Affect the Validity ofBargaining Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 505 (1979).
84 NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 674 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.), withdrawn, 696 F.2d 257 (3d
Cir. 1982) (en banc). Upon consideration by the court en banc, three dissenting judges would have
required evidence that employees had actually read the cards. NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery,
Inc., 696 F.2d at 268.
85 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 606. The Court's only exception to this direction
to bind employees to what they sign is to be applied where the language of the card "is deliber-
ately and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to
disregard and forget the language above his signature." Id
86 Id at 608.
87 NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 674 F.2d 197, 203 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing), withdrawn, 696 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
88 NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 522, 526 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J.,
concurring).
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well to the other courts that have exhibited a similar hostility to the
Board's Gissel orders. Judge Aldisert wrote:
The dispute here is not over application of a rule, but over the existence of
an entirely different precept: whether the NLRB has the power to order
an employer to bargain with a union that has not obtained representation
status by an election because of an employer's pervasive unfair labor
practices. Although recognizing that Gissel is binding precedent, panels
of this court have nonetheless tried to subvert it indirectly, focusing their
denial of enforcement on the Board's procedural failures.8 9
It appears that many circuit judges simply do not accept the fac-
tual premise underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel that
where a bare majority of employees sign authorization cards there is
sufficient evidence that the employees would likely have voted for the
union had a fair election been possible. An examination of the en-
forcement record of the courts in relationship to the percentage of au-
thorization cards obtained by the union provides further, if only
impressionistic, support for this conclusion. 90 This author made an in-
formal survey of recent circuit court decisions in which the percentage
of authorization cards that the union obtained could be ascertained
from the opinion. The survey included 29 elections. In the 18 elections
in which unions had collected cards from more than 60% of the em-
ployees, the courts enforced the Board's bargaining order in 83% of the
cases. In the 11 elections in which the union had cards from a majority
but less than 60% of the employees, the court enforced the bargaining
order in only 36% of the cases. While the court opinions make no ref-
erence to the percentage of authorization cards as an appropriate factor
in the enforcement of bargaining orders, it appears that courts may be
imposing their own rule of thumb that a union could not have been
expected actually to win the election unless it had obtained authoriza-
tion cards from more than a bare majority of employees. 91 The pattern
of judicial nonenforcement of Gissel bargaining orders underscores the
importance of investigating the empirical validity of the Supreme
Court's assumption in Gissel that unions that obtain cards from a ma-
jority of employees are likely to achieve an election victory in the ab-
sence of employer unfair labor practices.
89 Id, at 526 (Aldisert, J., concurring).
90 Any effort systematically to assess the enforcement history of Gissel bargaining orders in the
courts of appeals would be extremely difficult because the NLRB keeps no issue-specific record of
its enforcement success and many court of appeals decisions are unreported. Letter from Standau
E. Weinbrecht, Freedom of Information Officer, National Labor Relations Board, to the author,
(September 20, 1982).
91 One recent decision not included in the survey explicitly makes reference to the number of
authorization cards collected as a reason for declining to enforce a Gissel bargaining order. Judge
Posner, writing for the court, made reference to the limited empirical research about the predictive
value of authorization cards and concluded that a union with cards from 28 of 47 employees
(59.6%) would have lost the election, even in the absence of unfair labor practices. NLRB v.
Village IX, Inc., 723 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1983).
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III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF ELECTION BEHAVIOR
Although courts,92 labor law scholars,93 and the National Labor
Relations Board itselfP4 have called for empirical research about em-
ployee behavior in representation election campaigns, only limited re-
search actually has been conducted.95 The question of the relationship
between union authorization card signing and election outcome has
been addressed to some extent in four studies.
The most extensive study of union representation election cam-
paigns, conducted by Professors Getman, Goldberg, and Herman, con-
sidered a wide variety of behavioral assumptions underlying the
Board's regulation of campaign conduct.96 One of the issues addressed
in that study was whether authorization card signing is a reasonably
accurate predictor of votes in representation elections. The Getman
study considered 31 election campaigns, of which only 29 campaigns
included card signing. 97 The study did not have access to NLRB
records of authorization cards submitted; but rather relied upon-ques-
tioning of individual employees. 98 The study concluded that card sign-
ing was a reasonably accurate predictor of vote;99 finding that 72% of
the card signers voted for union representation and that 79% of the
non-signers voted against such representation. 100 The study also found
that the avrage loss in union support from card signing to voting was
4%.101 The Getman study, however, did not address directly the as-
sumption behind the Gissel bargaining order, that authorization cards
92 Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 323-24 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., dissenting);
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
93 See, e.g., Bok, Foreward to J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at xi-xiii; Grunewald, Empiri-
cisrm in NLRB Election Regulation: Shopping Kart and General Knit in Retrospect, 4 INDUS.
REL. LJ. 161, 197-203 (1981); Henry, Introduction: .4 Journey Into the Future-The Role of Empir-
ical Evidence in Developing Labor Law, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 1; Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behav-
ioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: 4 Proposal, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1441 (1977).
94 In the context of Board regulation of campaign misrepresentations, the Board has said that
it "welcome[s] research from the behavioral sciences," General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 622
(1978), and it has, on one occasion, based a policy change on an empirical study, Shopping Kart
Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1977). The Board's most recent decision on cam-
paign misrepresentation makes no reference to empirical studies. Midland National Life Ins. Co.,
263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
95 See, e.g., Heneman & Sandver, Predicting the Outcome of Union Certfcation Elections- A
Review ofthe Literature, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 537 (1983). See also authorities cited in J.
GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 5 n.24.
96 J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 1-32.
97 Id at 132 n.4.
98 Id at 40-42. In order to assess the accuracy of employee reports regarding card signing, the
researchers asked the union to indicate whether employees who had been interviewed had signed
an authorization card. The comparison between employee and union reports of card signing sug-
gested that nearly all employees answered the question about card signing honestly. Id at 41-42.
99 Id at 133.
100 Yd
101 Id at 100.
Union Election Outcome
signed accurately predict the number of employees who would vote for
the union in elections conducted in an atmosphere free of employer
unfair labor practices. The elections investigated in that study were not
a representative cross-section of elections; nor were they selected to il-
lustrate behavior in the absence of unfair labor practices. To the con-
trary, the small number of election campaigns studied were selected for
inclusion expressly because they were expected to produce vigorous,
possibly unlawful campaigning.10 2 The authors did find unlawful
campaigning in 22 of the 31 elections studied. 0 3 Although the Getman
study suggested that even where unlawful campaigning does occur, it
does not affect the election outcome, 04 the small size of the sample and
the selection criterion preclude it from answering the question of the
predictive value of authorization cards in elections in which unlawful
campaigning does not occur.
This failure to segregate clean elections from those in which unfair
labor practices have occurred is also present in the other three empiri-
cal studies of the relationship between card signing and election out-
come. Professor Philip Ross conducted a study for the National Labor
Relations Board, examining all 214 elections conducted by the Atlanta
regional office of the NLRB in 1960. The results of the study are re-
ported, only briefly, in a speech by Frank McCulloch, then- chairman
of the NLRB.105 The Ross study found that unions that had presented
authorization cards from 50-70% of the employees won only 52% of the
elections. 10 6 The Ross study made no attempt to report results sepa-
rately from elections in which there were no unfair labor practices com-
mitted. Further, since the data for elections with 50-70% card signing
are grouped together, it is impossible to ascertain election outcomes
where unions had only a bare majority of employees signing cards-
102 Id at 34.
103 id at 35. The study assessed illegality by examining Board findings if unfair labor practice
charges had been filed, and by an informal review of arguably illegal conduct by an administra-
tive law judge in cases in which no charges were filed. Id at 111. See also id. at 44-45 & nn. 19-
21.
104 Id at 121-24. Two other scholars who have reinterpreted data from the J. GETMAN STUDY,
supra note 12, reached the contrary conclusion. They concluded that although the Getman data
showed what its authors considered a statistically insignificant effect of illegal employer conduct,
the small effect noted nevertheless could produce substantial impacts upon election outcomes.
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Sef-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1782-86 (1983); Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Cert#Fication
Elections Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 (1983).
105 McCulloch, A Tale of Two Cities: Or Lawin Action, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRO-
CEEDINGS: SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 14 (1962).
106 Id at 17. While the speech stated that unions with cards from 50-70% of the employees
won 52% of the time, the speech says that they won 42 of 87 elections, which would be 48%. Either
the percentage or the numbers of elections or victories must be in error. When unions had cards
from 30-50% of the employees they won 19% of the elections. Those unions which had cards from
over 70% of the employees won 74% of the elections. Id
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cases in which Gissel would permit a bargaining order. The study also
failed to address other factors that might affect the predictive value of
card signing, such as the size of the bargaining unit.
A larger study of the relationship between authorization cards and
election outcomes is reported by Professor John Drotning.l0 7 Drotning
obtained data on 1,268 elections between 1956 and 1961 from the At-
lanta regional office of the NLRB that had been pre-grouped by the
NLRB into seven categories of percentages of authorization cards sub-
mitted, three categories of unit size, and two categories of election out-
come. 08 Drotning found that in units of fewer than 31 employees,
unions won about 57% of the time regardless of the showing of interest
as demonstrated by signed authorization cards, but that in larger units
outcome was more closely associated with the showing of interest. 1' 9
In units of 31-80 employees, union victories ranged from 41% (with 30-
39% authorization cards) to 52% (with 60-69% authorization cards). 10
In units of 81 employees or more, union victories ranged from 31%
(with 30-39% authorization cards) to 50% (with 60-69% authorization
cards). "' Drotning concluded that the showing of interest is positively
related to the percentage of elections won by unions, but found that
especially high showings of interest did not commensurately increase
the unioh'z likelihood of success.' 1 2 While the Drotning data permitted
consideration of the possible effect of unit size on election outcome, it
failed to differentiate elections in which unfair labor practices were
committed from other elections, and to consider other factors that
might have an impact on election outcome.
A more recent study by Professor Marcus Sandver contains these
same limitations, although his data were somewhat broader in scope
107 Drotning, NLRB Remediesfor Election Misconduct: An Analysis of Election Outcomes and
Their Determinants, 40 J. Bus. 137 (1967).
108 Id at 143.
109 Id at 144.
110 Id at 144, Table 4.
III Id
112 Drotning's results for units of all sizes for showings of interest over 50% are as follows:






Id Drotning also separately reported results from 120 elections from the Buffalo regional office
for fiscal years 1962-1964. The Buffalo data were reported individually for each election and
included the actual vote. Drotning concluded that the relationship between authorization cards
and union vote is not very strong. Id at 143-45. He found that consideration of the showing of
interest and bargaining unit size would explain only 21% of the variation in voting results. Id at
145, Table 5. A condensed version of the study's results are published in Drotning, The NLRB's
New Rule on Union Organizing: .4 Note, 18 LAB. L.J. 283 (1967).
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than those available to Drotning." 3 Sandver obtained access to infor-
mation about the 100 most recent single union elections in early 1977 in
12 NLRB regional offices.114 The study covered 1,174 elections about
which Sandver obtained the number of authorization cards, number of
eligible voters and number of votes obtained by the union. While
Sandver was able to report information about the actual number of
votes obtained, this was reported in only four categories. Sandver
found that unions that collected cards from 50% or more of the electo-
rate succeeded in 58.7% of the elections. 115 Sandver's study also con-
sidered, to a limited extent, the impact of unit size on the predictive
value of authorization cards. The only results that he reports that make
any reference to bargaining unit size reflect election outcome in 160
units with more than 100 workers. Among these large elections, of the
48 cases in which a union had authorization cards from more than 50%
of the employees, the union won only 43.7% of the elections."l 6
These four studies recognize the importance of empirically testing
the factual assumptions that form the basis of national labor policy
concerning authorization cards and union representation elections.
While these studies have indicated, in general, that authorization card
percentages have some value in predicting subsequent votes in favor of
the union, none of these studies evaluated data that would permit as-
sessment of the basic assumption in Gissel that authorization cards are
a reasonably accurate indication of outcome in elections conducted in
an atmosphere free of unfair labor practices. Further, while two of
these studies include a limited examination of the possible impact of
bargaining unit size on the predictive value of authorization cards, no
study has so far considered other factors that might affect the cards'
predictive utility. The research that has been accomplished suggests
the need to study further the relationship between authorization cards
and election outcomes within a research design that permits considera-
tion of unfair labor practices and the variety of other factors that might
influence election outcome.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The objective of the study conducted here was to obtain and ana-
lyze comprehensive information regarding a large number of union
elections. Such information is available only in the files of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board regional offices. Region Eighteen of the
NLRB, located in Minneapolis, was selected for study solely for con-
venience. The territory of Region Eighteen encompasses all of Minne-
113 Sandver, The Validity of UnionAuthorization Cards as a Predictor ofSuccess in NLRB Certi-
fication Elections, 28 LAB. L.J. 696 (1977).
114 Id at 698.
115 1d at 700.
116 Id at 701.
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sota, North Dakota, and South Dakota, as well as parts of Iowa and
Wisconsin. An agreement was negotiated with Region Eighteen to per-
mit access to representation and unfair labor practices case files of the
NLRB, which permitted the author to code any information contained
in the files except the identity of the parties. 1 7
All information was collected directly from the official files. At the
time the study was undertaken, Region Eighteen had available at its
office files for the calendar years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Following pre-
testing and amendment of coding instruments, a single research assis-
tant read and coded fies for all of the elections conducted during these
years in response to a union petition.11 8 A limited number of files was
separately coded by the author to test the accuracy of the work of the
research assistant. During coding, all of the documents in the file were
read to obtain information. These included documents that would or-
dinarily be available to the public, such as election petitions and re-
ports of election results, as well as confidential information reported by
board agents, such as the number of authorization cards collected.
Where there were several possible documents in the file that might re-
port the same information, such as number of employees in the bar-
gaining unit, the information was coded from each document. Only
information from the most reliable document available was used in the
data analysis. For example, the size of the bargaining unit becomes
more clearly defined as the pre-election procedures progress and there-
fore the latest assessment of size was considered the most reliable.
While the central purpose of the study was to explore the relation-
ship between authorization cards and election outcomes in cases in
which no unfair labor practices occurred, it was appropriate, once ac-
cess to the NLRB files had been granted, to gather information of any
kind available that might explain the results of union representation
elections. Information gathered from the fies included the size of the
bargaining unit, the votes in the election, the election outcome, objec-
tions to the election, if any, and whether the objections were based on
campaign conduct, the date and day of the week of the election, the
nature of the employer's business, the type of bargaining unit, the date
of the election petition, the nature of the union's and employer's repre-
sentation in the election proceedings, and the numbers and age of au-
thorization cards submitted by the union. Information about unfair
117 This study therefore is unable to report any information regarding election behavior of any
particular unions. It was also a condition of the agreement that the Regional Director would be
permitted to review the manuscript reporting the results of the study prior to its publication solely
to insure that no information would be published that would permit ascertainment of the identity
of any person, party, case, or proceeding.
118 The NLRB also conducts elections upon the request of an employer, to decertify existing
union representatives, and to deauthorize a union from entering into a union shop agreement.
NLRA, §§ 9(c)(1)(B), 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 9(e); 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(1)(B), 159 (c)(1)(A)(ii), 159(e) (1982).
No information on these other kinds of Board elections was collected for this study.
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labor practices obtained included whether charges were filed, the na-
ture of any charges filed, and their resolution. The only items gathered
that involved any subjectivity in coding whatsoever were the nature of
the employer's business and the nature of the parties' representatives.
The categories used for these items are explained in the Results Sec-
tion. The data were converted to a machine-readable format and as-
sembled by computer. The statistical consultant analyzed the computer
data at the direction of the author.
Fortunately, this study commenced collection of information re-
garding authorization cards at a time when such information was still
available from the NLRB. Beginning at the end of 1980, the Regional
Office began to phase in use of a new NLRB form which no longer
called for board agents to record the actual number and age of authori-
zation cards." 9 The new form does not require agents to note the ex-
tent to which the cards submitted by the union exceed the thirty percent
minimum for conducting an election. 20 Thus, it would be impossible
now to replicate this study using NLRB records for election proceed-
ings begun after 1980.
This study's sole reliance on information contained in NLRB files
suggests a possible weakness in its design. A central focus is on the
number of signed authorization cards obtained by a union. If a union
fails to turn in to the Board all of the cards it obtains, the Board's
records will be an inaccurate source of information about the number
of cards actually signed. In order to assess the significance of this pos-
sible problem in research design, a survey of union organizers was un-
dertaken to determine whether they are likely to supply the NLRB with
all of the cards they obtain in an election campaign.
Since it would be extremely difficult to obtain a statistically accu-
rate assessment of organizers' conduct, a limited anecdotal survey was
used. Organizers actively engaged in filing election petitions were
identified from recent petitions filed in the Region. An effort was made
to contact organizers from a variety of unions who participated in elec-
tions with a variety of types of employers and sizes of bargaining units.
No attempt was made to make the survey include a representative sam-
ple of organizers. Thirty organizers were contacted by telephone dur-
ing the fall of 1981 and the spring of 1982. Of the 30 organizers, 19
said that they always turn in to the Board all of their authorization
cards. Two organizers reported that they never turn in all of the cards.
Nine organizers reported that they usually turn in all of the cards ob-
119 By NLRB Memorandum 80-57, dated November 4, 1980, regional offices were directed to
use a revised form NLRB-4069 which required board agents to check whether the authorization
cards submitted represented less than 10% of the unit, 10-30% of the unit, or more than 30%.
Where the prior form had required agents to record the dates on which cards had been signed, the
new form only asked the agent to check a box indicating that the designations were current.
120 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tained, but that they withhold cards under special circumstances. The
two organizers who reported that they never turn in all the cards said
that they did so because they distrusted the ability of NLRB personnel
to maintain the confidentiality of the information and feared employer
reprisals. The nine organizers who reported that they declined to sub-
mit all cards under special circumstances mentioned a few situations
that they thought might warrant card withholding. A situation men-
tioned by more than half of these organizers was one in which they
feared an unusually vicious employer campaign and hoped that by
withholding cards they could mislead the employer about the strength
of union support. Another circumstance mentioned was where the
union had a special need to expedite the election process. Where expe-
dition was desired, these organizers might obtain a significant number
of cards over thirty percent, turn them in to get the Board processes
underway, and then continue to collect additional cards that would not
be submitted to the Board. This limited survey suggests that the NLRB
files probably provide substantially accurate records of the numbers of
authorization cards obtained by unions. The statistics that follow,
however, should be read with the recognition that at least some figures
probably underestimate the number of signed cards the union
obtained
Another limitation of the research design should be recognized:
since all data considered were obtained from the election and unfair
labor practice files of the NLRB, there was no opportunity to evaluate
any of the possible factors that influence election results of which no
record is made in official fies. For example, the files do not include
any information about the extent or nature of campaigning by either
unions or employers. Conduct that would have been considered an un-
fair labor practice but that was never reported to the NLRB is not in-
cluded in this study. The research design also precluded evaluating
changes in employees' sentiments toward unionization in workplaces in
which no election ever resulted.
V. RESULTS
There were 791 elections conducted upon the filing of a union peti-
tion in NLRB Region Eighteen during 1978, 1979, and 1980. In 31 of
these elections, more than one union sought representative status.
Analysis was limited to the 760 elections in which only one union par-
ticipated because the small number of multi-union elections did not
warrant the additional complexity that their analyses would require.
All of the information that follows, therefore, is limited to the 760
single-union elections.
Table 1 indicates the variation in the number of elections and the
success of unions during the three years studied, and shows that the
overall success rate of unions during the period of the study was 48.2%.
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TABLE 1
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION OUTCOME BY YEARS
Year N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
1978 287 37.8% 134 46.7%
1979 222 29.2% 113 51.0%
1980 251 33.0% 119 47.4%
All
Elections 760 100.0% 366 48.2%
Significance = .61
Differences in success rates between years were not significant.' 2 ' The
success rate of unions in Region Eighteen during the three-year period
appears to be slightly higher than the success rate of unions
nationally. t22
Table 2 shows the proportion of bargaining units in various size
categories and the rate of union success in each category. The number
of employees in bargaining units in which elections were conducted
ranged from 2 to 1,049. The mean unit size was 40.8 employees,
smaller than the national average.' 23 Table 2 indicates that the
121 In this and the following tables, the "significance" is the chance of observing differences at
least as large as those actually found in the data computed under the null hypothesis that no real
differences exist. Thus, small significance values increase the likelihood that observed differences
are real and not due to chance. Conventionally, values less than .05 are taken to be significant-
and thus real-differences, although this or any other cut-off value is arbitrary. In all the tables,
significance values are computed for two-tailed tests. For tables of counts, chi-squared tests for
significance were used. For tables of averages, t-tests or F-tests were used, as appropriate.
122 In the fiscal year that ended September 30, 1980, the NLRB nationally conducted 6,610
single-union elections initiated by union petition of which unions won 47.4%. 45 NLRB ANN.
REP. 270, Table 13 (1980). In the 1979 fiscal year, the NLRB conducted 6,672 such elections of
which unions won 46.3%. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 297, Table 13 (1979). For a possible explanation
of this difference in outcome see infra note 124 and accompanying text.
This footnote and infra notes 123-25 compare Region Eighteen to the rest of the country in
regard to union election success rates, size of bargaining units, and the nature of industries in
which elections are conducted. Additional information about the representativeness of Region
Eighteen can be obtained by comparing the extent of union membership in the region to member-
ship nationally. In 1980, 25.2% of the national workforce were union members. In the two states
in the region in which there were no right-to-work laws, union membership was slightly above the
national average, with Wisconsin at 28.6% and Minnesota at 26.2%. Union membership was be-
low the national average in the three remaining states that do have right-to-work laws, Iowa
(22.0%), North Dakota (17.1%), and South Dakota (14.7%). U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at 409, Table 682 (103d ed. 1982).
123 Precisely comparable information is not available from the NLRB Annual Report, but the
information suggests that units in Region Eighteen were, on the average, somewhat smaller than
units nationally. The NLRB reports that in fiscal 1980 in all types of elections (as opposed to just
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TABLE 2
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION OUTCOME BY SIZE OF UNIT
Size* N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
2-9 242 31.9 % 132 54.5%
10-20 180 23.7 % 92 51.1%
21-99 272 35.9 % 126 46.3%
100+ 64 8.4 % 15 23.4%
All
Elections 758 99.9 %** 365 48.2%
Significance = .0001
* Size is expressed in numbers of eligible voters.
Totals in this and subsequent tables may be more or less than 100% due to rounding.
size of the bargaining unit was closely related to the union's success
rate. In the study, unions won 54.5% of the elections in units with
under 10 employees, but only 23.4% of the elections with 100 or more
employees. 124 These statistics suggest that size influences outcome.
The lower average size of bargaining units in Region Eighteen there-
fore may i'xplain in part the greater success of unions in that Region
elections conducted upon the petition of a single union) the average number of employees voting
per establishment was 56, compared with 63 in 1979. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1980).
124 While precisely comparable information on unit size is not available from the NLRB An-
nual Report, a rough comparison can be made between the information from Region Eighteen
and the national statistics. The data reported in Table 2 are for elections in calendar years 1978-
1980. The data in Table A below are for fiscal year 1980. The Region Eighteen data include only
single union elections, petitioned for by a union. The national data below report single and multi-
union elections petitioned for by either a union or an employer. The inclusion of multi-union
elections would raise the level of union success while the employer petitions would lower union
success rates. Note also that national data are reported in slightly different size categories. With
these caveats, Table A represents elections and election outcome by size on a national basis for
fiscal year 1980 derived from 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 286, Table 17 (1980).
TABLE A
ELECTIONS AND EIECTION OUTCOME BY SIZE OF UNIT
NLRB NATIONAL DATA FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980
Size of Unit N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
Under 10 1691 23.2 % 953 56.4%
10-19 1593 21.8 % 815 51.2%
20-99 2949 40.4 % 1395 47.3%
100-1999 1056 14.5 % 342 32.4%
1999+ 7 0.0 % 3 42.9%
Totals 7296 99.9 %* 3508 48.1%
* Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.
Although Tables 2 and A show a significantly different distribution of unit size (Table 2 has more
small units and fewer large ones), there is no evidence that, adjusting for the size of the unit, the
odds of union victory are different in the two tables. This can be evaluated statistically by a
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than in the nation as a whole. The significance of unit size in determin-
ing outcome probably reflects the relative ease with which union or-
ganizers are able to communicate with employees in small workplaces.
The legal restrictions that preclude nonemployee organizers from ac-
cess to the workplace, that do not require employers to provide unions
with names and addresses of employees until just before the election
and that permit an employer to deny the union an opportunity to ad-
dress employees at the workplace are likely to be a much greater im-
pediment to organization in a large bargaining unit than in a small one.
A large bargaining unit may also be more likely to include employees
with diverse working experiences who are not so easily united by the
themes of a union campaign.
Table 3 indicates the distribution of elections among various kinds
of bargaining units and the relative success of unions in those units.
The types of bargaining units are arranged in ascending order of union
TABLE 3
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION OUTCOME BY BARGAINING
UNIT
Type of Unit N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
Craft 29 3.8% 9 31.0%
Guard 5 .7% 2 40.0%
Industrial 404 53.4% 183 45.3%
Office 66 8.7% 31 47.0%
Combination 12 1.6% 6 50.0%
Truckers 76 10.0% 39 51.3%
Department 114 15.1% 64 56.1%
Professional 51 6.7% 31 60.8%
All
Elections 757 100.0% 362 48.1%
Significance = .12
method described in S. FIENBERG, THE ANALYSIS OF CROSS-CLASSIFIED CATEGORICAL DATA (2d
ed. 1980). Under this method, the two tables are treated as "layers" of a three dimensional table
(with the two categories of elections over 100 voters in Table A pooled together). Assuming that
all elections in Table 2 are reported in Table A, the model states that union success rate given size
of the unit is the same for the two layers. The results of the test are: X2 = 3.02, d.f. = 4, signifi-
cance = 0.5. There is thus no evidence that the region studied differs from the nation with respect
to union success rate.
A close relationship between small unit size and union success was also observed in a study of
a sample including 647 single-union elections nationally for the period March through September
1966, Rose, What Factors Influence Union Representation Elections, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 49
(Oct. 1972), and in a review of NLRB annual reports for the fiscal years 1966-70 reported in
Chaison, Unit Size and Union Success in Representation Elections, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 51 (Feb.
1973).
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success rates. Most elections in the region were conducted in industrial
units in which the union success rate was 45.3%, lower than the rate of
48.1% for all elections. The highest success rate was 60.8% in units of
professional employees.
Table 4 describes the distribution of elections among industries
and the success of unions in the various industries. Industries are ar-
ranged in descending order of the industry's proportion of elections.
Table 4 shows no significant relationship in the region between the na-
ture of the employing industry and the outcome of the election. 125
While the data reported thus far for Region Eighteen are similar to
publicly reported information available to earlier researchers, many of
the results that follow are dependent upon the unusual degree of access
the NLRB afforded for this study. The access to raw information in the
files of the regional office permitted consideration of data derived from
unfair labor practice files related to representation case files as well as
TABLE 4
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION OUTCOME BY EMPLOYING
INDUSTRY
Industry* N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
Manufacturing 307 40.4% 140 45.6%
Service 165 21.7% 80 48.5%
Wholesale 95 12.5% 42 .44.2%
Retail 78 10.3% 40 51.3%
Trans-
portation 76 10.0% 48 63.2%
Construction 29 3.8% 10 34.5%
Insurance 7 .9% 5 71.4%
Mining 2 .3% 0 0.0%
All
Elections 759 99.9% 365 48.1%
Significance = .06
* Industrial Codes used were the same reported in Table 16, 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 284
(1980). "Insurance" includes finance, insurance and real estate. "Transportation" includes
transportation, communication and other utilities.
125 Only a very rough comparison can be made between the regional data reported in Table 4
and the national experience of union elections in various industries, because the NLRB Annual
Report only reports industry classifications for elections as a whole, without differentiating single
from multiple union elections, and without separating the variety of kinds of elections (union-
sought elections, employer-sought elections, and decertification elections). The national data are
for fiscal year 1980, while the regional data in Table 4 are for calendar years 1978-80. Table B
below is derived from 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 284, Table 16 (1980). For ease of comparison, indus-
tries here are reported in the same order as in Table 4.
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records of authorization cards submitted to the Board. The access to
unfair labor practice and authorization card records permitted a direct
test of the assumption that employer unfair labor practices demonstra-
bly weaken employees' support for a union.
In this study an employer unfair labor practice was counted as
having occurred if the case was resolved either by settlement or by a
final finding by an administrative law judge, the NLRB, or a court that
an unfair labor practice had been committed. 26 This method of deter-
mining which elections were conducted in the presence of unfair labor
practices caused a variety of situations to be counted as clean elections.
While most elections placed in the "no unfair labor practices" category
are likely to be those in which no illegal conduct occurred, it is possible
that in some of the elections included in this category unlawful behav-
ior occurred that was not the subject of any unfair labor practice
charges. For example, a union might not file charges if, after winning
the election, it feared that filing would interfere with the positive rela-
tionship with the employer needed for upcoming collective bargaining
negotiations. In addition, a union might be able to settle informally or
TABLE B
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION OUTCOME BY EMPLOYING INDUSTRY
NLRB NATIONAL DATA FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980
N % N %
Industry Elections Elections Union Won Union Won
Manufacturing 3482 42.5% 1473 42.3%
Service 1600 19.5% 836 52.2%
Wholesale 522 6.4% 216 41.4%
Retail 936 11.4% 414 44.2%
Transportation 1135 13.8% 541 47.7%
Construction 265 3.2% 135 50.9%
Insurance 156 1.9% 82 52.6%
Mining 91 1.1% 39 42.9%
Public Admin.
& Postal I 1 0.1% 8 72.7%
Totals 8198 99.9% 3744 45.7%
Each industry's proportionate share of elections in Tables 4 and B is generally similar, except
that there was a substantially larger percentage of elections in the wholesale industry in the region
than in the nation as a whole. In both tables, unions had above average success in the service,
transportation, and insurance classifications. In the region, unions in the retail industry per-
formed above average while their success nationally was slightly below average. There was a
substantial difference in the performance of unions in the construction industry, where nationally
they ranked above average but in the region had the second lowest success rate of any industrial
category.
126 This definition of an unfair labor practice will result in finding fewer unfair labor practices
than did the definition used in the Getman study because that study evaluated employer conduct
independently in cases in which no unfair labor practice charges were filed. J. GETMAN STUDY,
supra note 12, at I11. See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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by a grievance procedure a problem that might otherwise have been the
subject of an unfair labor practice charge. It is also possible that a
union, having lost an election, will no longer have sufficient interest in
the workplace to file an unfair labor practice charge. Therefore, in the
report of data that follows, it is possible that a few of the elections
included under the label "no unfair labor practices" are ones in which
unlawful conduct occurred but a formal charge to the NLRB was never
made.
Two possible measures of the impact of employer unfair labor
practices upon elections are election outcome and the extent to which a
union loses support between the time authorization cards are signed
and the election. These two measures are reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 reports the variation in election outcome between clean elec-
tions and those in which the employer committed unfair labor prac-
tices. Employer unfair labor practices were found in 53 (or 7%) of the
elections conducted in 1978-1980 in the region. The employer was
found to have violated .section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act by discriminating against union supporters with regard to terms of
employment in 21 cases and in 36 cases independent section 8(a)(1)
violations were found concerning interference with employees' rights
protected by the Act. 127 Although Table 5 shows that unions won a
higher percentage of elections where no unfair labor practices were
committed than where there were, the differences in Table 5 were not
statistically significant.
TABLE 5




Practices N Elections % Elections N Union Won % Union Won
No 707 93.0% 343 48.5%
Yes 53 7.0% 23 43.4%
All
Elections 760 100.0% 366 48.2%
Significance = .47
Since outcome fails to take account of the extent of union support
prior to the commission of unfair labor practices, a better measure of
whether unfair labor practices influence voting is obtained by examin-
127 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text for the statutory language and examples of
the sorts of conduct considered to be unfair labor practices under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).
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TABLE 6




Practices Elections Mean Vote Loss Standard Deviation
No 628 13.4% 27.9%
Yes 44 12.6% 24.2%
All
Elections 672* 13.3% 27.7%
Significance = .85
* In 88 cases the file did not contain some datum necessary for this calculation, usually the
number of authorization cards submitted.
ing the degree to which union support declines between the signing of
authorization cards and the election. This measure is labeled "vote
loss" and is defined as the percentage of employees signing authoriza-
tion cards minus the percentage of employees voting for the union at
the election. The relationship between employer unfair labor practices
and vote loss is indicated in Table 6, which shows that unions, on the
whole, lost 13.3% of their support from the time of card signing to the
election. 128 Table 6 indicates that in elections in which empl6yer unfair
labor practices occurred, the union lost less support than it did in clean
elections, although this difference is not statistically significant. While
Table 6 does not indicate that employer unfair labor practices actually
improve a union's chance of success, the results provide no support for
the NLRB's assumption that employer unfair labor practices substan-
tially decrease union support.
In light of these findings, which indicated no adverse impact of
employer unfair labor practices on union support generally, efforts
were made to determine whether employer unfair labor practices re-
duce union voting strength in any types of elections. Comparisons of
various bargaining units and industries also revealed no discernable
128 To the extent that union organizers may withhold authorization cards from the NLRB, as
discussed in Section IV supra, this figure will understate the actual extent of vote loss. An approx-
imate measure of vote loss that accounts for this possible understatement can be made by measur-
ing vote loss only for those elections in which unions submitted cards from more than 50% of the
voters, since card withholding is much less likely to have occurred in such cases. When vote loss
was calculated only for those elections in which unions submitted cards from more than 50% of
the electorate, the mean vote loss was 15.2%. The difference in vote loss reported here between
elections with unfair labor practices and clean elections may be distorted, if as is probably the
case, card withholding occurred more often in elections with unfair labor practices than in clean
elections.
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impact of unfair labor practices on union support. Since the NLRB has
suggested that unfair labor practices might have a greater impact on
elections in small units,129 vote loss was also calculated for units of var-
ious sizes in both clean elections and elections involving unfair labor
practices. These results appear in Table 7.
Table 7 shows that in the smallest units, those with less than ten
employees, the mean vote loss was 26.6% in unfair labor practice elec-
tions and 20.7% in clean elections. In units with between ten and
twenty employees, however, the pattern was reversed, with unions los-
ing 15.7% of their support in clean elections and only 5.7% in elections
with unfair labor practices. Table 7 shows no statistically significant
evidence that employer unfair labor practices negatively influence
TABLE 7
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO UNIT SIZE AND
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Unfair Labor Practices Committed
Size Yes No
of
Unit N Mean Vote Loss N Mean Vote Loss
2-9 11 26.6% 208 20.7%
10-20 13 5.7% 147 15.7%
21-99 17 8.0% 225 6.4%
99+ 3 16.6% 48 .7%
All
Elections 44 12.6% 628 13.4%
Significance = .47*
Averaging over all unit sizes.
129 For example, the Board has said that "the [small] size of the work force ... militates in
favor of issuing a bargaining order. The impact of [an employer's] unfair labor practices is height-
ened considerably and prolonged when they occur in a small bargaining unit of employees ......
Martin City Ready Mix, 264 N.L.R.B. No. 66, slip op. at 8-9 (Sept. 30, 1982). In attempting to
satisfy the demands of the directive of the court of appeals for specific reasons justifying a bar-
gaining order, the Board in another case stated, "felxperience has shown that an employer's un-
lawful conduct is magnified when directed at a small number of employees." Jamaica Towing,
Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 353, 354 (1980) enforcement granted in part, denied inpart, NLRB v. Jamaica
Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1980). See supra notes 80-81 for a further discussion of
Jamaica Towing. In NLRB v. Maidsville Coal Co., 718 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert.
denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3651 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984)(No. 83-1073), the court enforced a bargaining order
by accepting the Board's assertion that it was justified because of "the small size of the employee
complement in question and the substantial percentage of the workforce subjected to the Em-
ployer's unlawful terminations and other unfair labor practices." Maidsville Coal Co., 257
N.L.R.B. 1106, 1106 n.l (1981). There were nine employees in the bargaining unit in that case.
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union support in elections in small units. Vote loss i, )pears substan-
tially the same for each size class regardless of the comi ission of unfair
labor practices.
In further search of support for the NLRB's assumption about the
influence of employer unfair labor practices, the impact of unfair labor
practices on vote loss in close elections, defined here as elections in
which the union received between 45% and 55% of the vote, was
examined.
TABLE 8
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO EMPLOYER UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES IN CLOSE ELECTIONS*
N Standard
Unfair Labor Practices Elections Vote Loss Deviation
No 93 8.1% 21.4%
Yes 10 - 7.9%** 13.5%
All Elections 103 6.5% 21.3%
Significance = .023
* Close elections are those in which the union received between 45% and 55% of the votes.
** A negative vote loss indicates a gain in union support.
Table 8 shows that in close elections there was a significant differ-
ence in vote loss related to unfair labor practices. In close elections,
where unfair labor practices were committed, unions gained an average
of 7.9%; yet where no unfair labor practices were committed, unions
lost an average of 8.1% of their support.130 Thus, in close elections,
where the only statistically significant evidence of an impact of unfair
labor practices on union support was found, the evidence is completely
contrary to the Board's assumption that employer unfair labor practices
cause unions to lose support. Of course, this study provided no means
to ascertain why employer unfair labor practices tended to increase
support for the union in these elections. Nevertheless, one can specu-
late that perhaps employees, rather than being intimidated out of vot-
ing for the union by the employer's actions, considered such actions
further cause for seeking the protection of a union.
Apart from this limited evidence about close elections, this study
130 It is possible that the vote gain shown in the close elections with unfair labor practices could
actually reflect authorization card withholding rather than an actual gain in support. In order to
check for this phenomenon, a calculation was made of the percentage of authorization cards sub-
mitted for each of the ten close elections in which unfair labor practices occurred. This calcula-
tion showed that authorization cards submitted for these ten elections ranged from 37.5% to 66.7%
and averaged 48.7%, with a standard deviation of 0.095. This demonstrates that the vote gain
shown in Table 8 is an actual gain and not a reflection of card withholding.
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reveals no detectable differences in union vote loss related to commis-
sion of employer unfair labor practices. The absence of any such dif-
ference makes it appropriate to report the remaining data for the study
as a whole without segregating elections in which unfair labor practices
were committed. 13 '
A central inquiry in this study was the extent to which signed au-
thorization cards are an accurate indication of the support that a union
could expect on election day. The mean vote loss of 13.3% for all elec-
tions, shown in Table 6, is strong evidence that the percentage of au-
thorization cards obtained in general substantially overrepresents the
union's voting strength. This finding warrants further inquiry into the
question of whether the Board, in Gissel cases, is correctly assuming
that a union with authorization cards from a majority of employees in a
unit is likely to obtain majority support in a subsequent election.
TABLE 9
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATION TO PROPORTION OF
VOTERS WHO SIGNED CARDS
% Employees
Who Signed N % N Union % Union
Cards* Elections Elections Won Won
30% 91 12.0% 41 45.1%
30-40%** 73 9.6% 21 28.8%
40-50% 118 15.5% 32 27.1%
50-60% 115 15.1% 47 40.9%
60-70% 102 13.4% 55 53.9%
70-80% 92 12.1% 60 65.2%
80-90% 61 8.0% 39 63.9%
90-100% 108 14.2% 71 65.7%
All
Elections 760 99.9% 366 48.2%
Significance = 0
* "% Employees Who Signed Cards" used throughout this article, includes only those
cards that were actually submitted to the Board. See discussion supra Section iV.
** In this and subsequent tables in which data appears to be reported in overlapping cate-
gories, the data reported within a category includes all numbers greater than the first number
and less than or equal to the second number, e.g., the category of 30%-40% includes all elec-
tions in which more than 30% and less than or equal to 40% of employees had signed cards.
131 S. FIENBERG, supra note 124, at 49. This result--that employer unfair labor practices do
not negatively affect union support-improves the utility of prior studies that themselves have
failed to distinguish unfair labor practice elections from others. See supra text accompanying
notes 92-116.
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Table 9 demonstrates the relationship between percentage of cards
submitted and election outcome. Table 9 shows that unions that sub-
mitted authorization cards from 30% of the employees, the smallest
proportion of cards that the Board will accept in order to hold an elec-
tion, won 45.1% of the time, but unions that submitted cards from 30-
50% of the employees won less than 30% of the time. This result proba-
bly does not reflect a reality that unions with fewer cards do better, but
rather that among those unions that submitted cards from precisely
30% of the employees to the NLRB, some were deliberately holding
back cards or submitting cards early in an election campaign in an at-
tempt to expedite the election process. 132
Omitting the abberant category of unions that submitted exactly
30% cards, Table 9 shows a direct relationship between authorization
cards submitted and election results: the larger the proportion of cards
submitted, the more likely the union is to win the election. Note specif-
ically that in elections in which the union had authorization cards from
a bare majority of the electorate-situations in which the Board would
find the cards sufficient to permit a bargaining order under Gissel-
unions won only 40.9% of the time. Only when a union had cards from
more than 60% of employees did it achieve at least an even chance of
winning the election. Another interesting finding in Table 9 is that an
increase in the proportion of authorization cards collected over 70% did
not substantially increase the union's chance of success. Unions with
authorization cards from 90-100% of the employees still-won only
65.7% of the time.
Another measure of the relationship between authorization cards
and election outcome is the comparison between the mean number of
authorization cards submitted in all elections and the mean number
submitted in elections in which the union won. The mean proportion of
authorization cards submitted for all elections was 65.7%. In elections
in which unions ultimately won, the mean proportion of authorization
cards submitted was 71.9%; in elections in which unions lost the mean
proportion of cards was 59.9%.133
A regression analysis is another way to express the relationship
between authorization card collection and union vote. A regression
analysis of the elections studied produced the following equation:
Union vote = .21 + 48 X (% cards)
(R2 = .13)
Applying this equation, it can be calculated that a union that receives a
132 See the discussion at the end of Section IV supra exploring the incidence of and possible
reasons for organizers withholding authorization cards from the Board.
133 Significance = 0
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TABLE 10
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATIONSHIP TO TIME
BETWEEN PETITION AND ELECTION
Election N Standard
Outcome Elections Mean Days Deviation
Union Won 363 48.44 34.43
Union Lost 392 58.41 68.49
All Elections 755 53.62 55.01
Significance = .012
bare majority of cards (51%) can be expected to receive votes from only
46% of the employees. 134 Or, applying the analysis differently, in order
to expect to receive a majority vote (51%), a union would need to re-
ceive authorization cards from 62.5% of the employees. 35
While the focus of the study was upon authorization cards and
unfair labor practices, the opportunity to have access to a broad range
of information contained in NLRB files permitted consideration of
other factors that might affect election results. Among the other factors
considered were the delay between card signing and the election, the
nature of the parties' representatives in the election proceedings, the
election turnout, and the day of the week on which the election was
held.
It is commonly believed that the longer the delay between a
union's submission of an election petition and the election, the less
likely the union will be to win the election. 136 The evidence in this
study provides some support for this assumption, although the results
are not entirely consistent with the assumption. Table 10 presents the
mean period of time, in days, between the election petition and the
election, for all elections, and for various election outcomes. Table 10
shows that for all elections in the study, the mean number of days be-
134 .21 + .48 (.51) = .21 + .25 = .46 = Vote
135 C = % Cards
.51 = .21 + .48C
.30 = .48C
.625 = C
136 A guide for union organizers warns them to beware of employer efforts to insist upon full
NLRB hearings in a desire to "stall the election until enthusiasm for the union has waned." S.
SCHLOSSBERG & J. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 181 (3d ed. 1983). A guide for employers
facing union campaigns advises them that expediting an election "is usually unwise." R. LEwis &
W. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENT'S STRATEGY AND PREVENTIVE PRO-
GRAMS 152 (2d ed. 1979). Employers are advised to seek an election date that gives them "as much
time as is necessary to furnish employees with sufficient facts to make an informed decision." Id
at 153. See also Roomkin & Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of Representation
Elections. Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75, 76-77.
Union Election Outcome
TABLE 11
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP To TIME BETWEEN
PETITION AND ELECTION
Days
Between N Mean Standard
Petition and Elections Vote Deviation
Election Loss
15-30 82 15.5% 35.0%
31-45 263 9.5% 24.6%
46-60 214 16.0% 28.3%
61-90 93 17.1% 26.8%
91-773 17 10.1% 23.6%
All Elections 669 13.4% 27.7%
Significance = .05
tween the petition and the election was 53.62. That period of time was
shorter, a mean of 48.44 days, when unions won. The time period was
longer than average, or a mean of 58.41 days, when unions lost. 37 Ta-
ble 10 thus provides support for the assumption that delay between the
.petition and election decreases the union's chance of victory.
There are a variety of reasons that might cause delay to'decrease
the likelihood of a union victory. The union's campaign commences
before the employer's campaign. The longer the period in which the
employer has actively campaigned, the more likely it is that employees
will be persuaded by the employer's viewpoint. Furthermore, it may be
difficult for a union to sustain enthusiasm over a long period. Also,
perhaps as time passes employee turnover has an increased impact on
election results. Union supporters may be more likely to be dissatisfied
with their jobs and therefore more likely to obtain other employment
during a delay.
A more precise measure of the impact of delay than election out-
come, however, is probably the degree of vote loss-that is, the amount
of support the union lost between card signing and the election. Here,
the impact of delay is less clear. Table 11 displays the relationship be-
tween vote loss and the time between the petition and the election. The
table shows that unions retained their support to the greatest extent,
137 Another study, using data supplied by the NLRB for over 45,000 single union elections
between July 1972 and September 1978 also found a difference of about ten days in the period
from petition to election between elections in which unions won (1.9 months) and elections in
which employers won (2.2 months). Roomkin & Block, supra note 136, at 88. Earlier studies
concerning the impact of delay are briefly described in the same article. ld at 77.
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TABLE 12
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO AGE OF CARDS AT
ELECTION
Age of
Cards N Mean Vote Standard
in Weeks Elections Loss Deviation
Under 2 12 12.6% 38.0%
2 to 4 27 18.4% 35.5%
4 to 8 54 8.1% 30.7%
8 to 12 43 10.5% 22.0%
12 to 16 42 12.4% 27.7%
16 to 24 92 10.9% 27.3%
24 to 36 104 15.8% 27.7%
36 to 52 53 11.6% 25.8%
Over 52 10 21.4% 21.4%
All Elections 437 12.7% 27.9%
Significance = .70
losing only 9.5% of their support, in elections held between 31 and 45
days after the signing of the petition. In contrast to popular wisdom,
the union's support dropped to a substantially greater degree-15.5%--
in elections held the shortest period of time after the petition, between
15 and 30 days. Also contrary to expectations, in elections with the
greatest delays between petition and election-more than 90 days-un-
ions lost only 10.1% of their support.
Another measure of the impact of time on maintenance of union
support reveals a similarly inconclusive pattern. From the files in
which it was possible to determine the dates on which the authorization
cards were signed, a calculation was made of the average age of author-
ization cards on the date of the election. Then the mean vote loss for
each category of authorization card age was computed. Table 12 re-
ports the relationship between age of authorization cards and vote loss.
Note that since there was a substantial number of elections in which
information about the age of the cards was incomplete, Table 12 re-
ports data for a smaller number of elections than did the prior tables.
The results in Table 12 reveal a pattern similar to that in Table 11, with
union support dropping sharply in elections held relatively close to the
date of card signing. There is a distinct contrast between elections in
which the cards were between two and four weeks old, in which union
support dropped by 18.4%, and elections with cards between four and
Union Election Outcome
eight weeks old, in which vote loss was at its lowest level of 8.1%. One
can only speculate about why a union would lose substantial support in
an election held quickly after card signing or the filing of an election
petition. It may be that unions require some minimal period of time in
which to respond effectively to employer campaign arguments. It could
also be that quick elections are only held in those cases in which an
employer, knowing of its strength, is willing to consent to an early elec-
tion. In Table 12, as in Table 11, there is no showing of a consistent
decline in union strength as time passes. To summarize the data on the
impact of the passage of time on union support, there is some evidence,
in Table 10, examining only the outcome of the elections, that delay
lessens the likelihood of a union victory, but examining vote loss, a
more precise measure of impact, in Tables 11 and 12, there is no evi-
dence that the passage of time produces a corresponding decrease in
union strength.
Another factor examined for its possible effect upon election out-
comes was the nature of the representatives that companies and unions
selected to represent them in the NLRB proceedings. In recent years
concern has been expressed about a widespread increase in the use of
labor consultants, those who specialize in advising companies how to
remain or become union-free. 38 An effort was made to assess the pos-
sible impact of labor consultants on election results. Since the only
source of data for the study was NLRB files, the following tables can be
expected to provide a somewhat inexact measure of actual representa-
tion. It may be, for example, that an employer used a management
consulting firm to assist in the union representation election campaign,
but the firm never had any contact with the NLRB. In such a case, the
file would not correctly reveal the nature of the company's representa-
tion. Tables 13 through 18 report election results in relationship to the
nature of the parties' representative as reflected in NLRB files.
Table 13 reports the frequencies of each category of company rep-
resentation and the election results for each category. Table 13 shows
that a majority of all employers were represented by attorneys and that
employers represented by attorneys were significantly more likely than
other employers to defeat the union effort. Less than a quarter of all
employers used labor consultants. Employers relying on labor consul-
138 See, e.g., Lawler, Labor-Management Consultants in Union Organizing Campaigns: Da They
Make a Difference? 1981 INDUs. REL. RESEARCH A. PROC. THIRTY-FOURTH ANN. MEETING 374,
in which the author concluded from a study of NLRB representation and decertification elections
in 155 grocery stores that the presence of a consultant on behalf of the employer reduced the
likelihood of employees voting in favor of bargaining. Id at 377. The impact of employer consul-
tants was a central focus of extended congressional hearings in 1979. 1, 2 Pressures in Today's
Workplace: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the
House Conm on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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TABLE 13




Representative Elections % Elections % Union Won
Officer 139 18.3% 56.8%
Attorney 437 57.7% 43.5%
Consultant 177 23.4% 51.4%
Other 5 0.7% 80.0%
All Elections 758 100.1% 48.1%
Significance = .012
tants were more likely to win elections than were employers who han-
dled the election with their own officials, but less likely to win than
employers represented by attorneys. 39
Table 14 reports information regarding unions' representatives.
Table 14 shows that 67.2% of unions use no outside representation in
elections and instead have an employee of the union handle the elec-
tion. Unions were about half as likely as employers to retain an attor-
ney, and rarely used consultants. Comparing election outcomes with
the nature of the unions' representatives revealed no statistically signifi-
cant results.
TABLE 14
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATIONSHIP TO UNION
REPRESENTATION
Union N
Representative Elections % Elections % Union Won
Official 507 67.2% 50.1%
Attorney 239 31.7% 43.1%
Consultant 8 1.1% 75.0%
All Elections 754 100.0% 48.1%
Significance = .06
139 A recent survey reporting responses from 52 companies involved in NLRB elections also
found that employers without outside assistance in an election were more likely to lose.
Murrmann & Porter, Employer Campaign Tactics and NLRB Election Outcomes: Some Prelimi-
nary Evidence, 1982 INDUs. REL. RESEARCH A. PROC. THIRTY-FIFTH ANN. MEETING 67, 69.
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Using the measure of vote loss, the drop in union support from the
time of card signing to the election, revealed no statistically significant
impact of either union or company representatives upon voting behav-
ior. Table 15 indicates mean vote loss for the various categories of
company representatives and Table 16 reports vote loss in relationship
to the union's representative. While Tables 15 and 16 show that com-
panies and unions that hired labor consultants did better than average
in eroding or maintaining union support, respectively, in neither case
were the differences so great as to be statistically significant.
TABLE 15
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO EMPLOYER
REPRESENTATION
Employer N Mean Vote Standard
Representative Elections Loss Deviation
Officer 124 12.3% 30.4%
Attorney 381 13.1% 25.3%
Consultant 161 14.4% 31.1%
Other 4 19.6% 6.6%
All Elections 670 13.3% 27.7%
Significance = .89
TABLE 16
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO UNION
REPRESENTATION
Union N Mean Vote Standard
Representative Elections Loss Deviation
Official 450 13.2% 27.1%
Attorney 208 14.0% 29.3%
Consultant 8 3.9% 17.3%
Unknown 1 6.3% 0.0%
All Elections 667 13.3% 27.7%
Significance = .77
The data were further examined in an attempt to determine
whether the presence of labor consultants increased the likelihood of
the commission of unfair labor practices. Table 17 displays the rela-
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tionship between the nature of the company's representative and the
commission of unfair labor practices.
TABLE 17
EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES IN RELATIONSHIP
TO EMPLOYER REPRESENTATION
Employer N % Elec- N Elec- % Elec- N Elec-
Represen- Elections tions tions tions tions
tation Involving Involving Involving Involving
§ 8(a)(1) § 8(a)(1) § 8(a)(3) § 8(a)(3)
Violations Violations Violations Violations
Officer 139 2.2% 3 2.8% 1
Attorney 437 2.3% 10 4.8% 21
Consultant 177 4.5% 8 7.9% 14
All
Elections 753 2.8% 21 4.8% 36
Significance for 8(a)(1) = .28
Significance for 8(a)(3) = .01
There was no evidence of significantly more violations of section
8(a)(1), involving generalized coercion of employees, when any type of
company representative was present, but there was evidence that sec-
tion 8(a)(3) violations, involving discrimination regarding terms of em-
ployment-most commonly discharges for union activity-were more
likely to occur in elections in which the company was represented by a
consultant.
To summarize the information regarding the impact of the use of
labor consultants, the study found that employers' use of consultants
had no demonstrable impact in improving the employer's likelihood of
success in the election or eroding employee support for the union.
There was, however, evidence that discriminatory conduct against em-
ployees is more likely to occur in elections in which employers are rep-
resented by a consultant.
Some recent research has focused upon the impact of the rate of
employee participation in NLRB elections. t40 Studies have indicated
the high rate of voter turnout in NLRB elections. One survey of elec-
tions between July 1972 and September 1978 found that 89.9% of all
eligible voters participated in NLRB single union nondecertification
140 Block & Roomkin, A Preliminary Analysis of the Parlicipation Rafe and the Margin of Vic-
tory in NLRB Elections, 1981 INDUS. REL. RESEARCH A. PROC. THIRTY-FOURTH ANN. MEETING
220. The authors found that participation rates decline as the margin of victory in the election
increases and that the decline was greater in elections that the union won. Id at 224.
Union Election Outcome
TABLE 18
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATIONSHIP TO MEAN
EMPLOYEE TURNOUT
Election N Mean Standard
Outcome Elections Turnout Deviation
Union Won 365 86.9% 15.3%
Union Lost 392 89.5% 12.9%
All Elections 757 88.2% 14.1%
Significance = .011
elections. 141 For the fiscal year 1980, the NLRB reported a turnout rate
of 87.8%.142 The participation rate of employees in the elections con-
sidered for this study was also very high. The turnout rates for all elec-
tions and for elections of varying outcomes are presented in Table 18.
The term "turnout" describes the result of dividing the number of ac-
tual voters by the number of eligible voters. Since NLRB procedures
permit persons to vote who may have not been considered eligible ini-
tially, it is possible for the turnout in an election to exceed 100%. Table
18 shows that 88.2% of employees voted in the representation elections
TABLE 19
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATIONSHIP TO
TURNOUT
EMPLOYEE
Turnout N Elections % Elections % Union Won
Under 30% 5 .7% 80.0%
30-40% 3 .4% 100.0%
40-50% 10 1.3% 60.0%
50-60% 19 2.5% 52.6%
60-70% 43 5.7% 58.1%
70-80% 97 12.8% 47.4%
80-90% 174 23.0% 52.9%
90-95% 85 11.2% 38.8%
95%+ 321 42.4% 45.5%
All Elections 757 100.0% 48.2%
Significance = .11
141 Id at 222.
142 45 NLRB ANN. RaP. 16 (1980). In that year, the Board held 8,198 conclusive representa-
tion elections in which a total of 521,602 employees were eligible to vote and in which 458,114 cast
ballots. Id. at 15-16.
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in the region during the three years of the study. There was a signifi-
cantly higher average turnout in elections that unions lost (89.5%) than
in elections that unions won (86.9%).
Table 19 provides another way of looking at the relationship be-
tween turnout and election outcome. Table 19 shows that in 42.4% of
elections in the region the turnout exceeded 95% and that in more than
three-quarters of the elections the turnout surpassed 80%. Although the
rate of union success does not decline directly with each increment of
employee turnout, the pattern of union success rates in Table 19 rein-
forces the finding of Table 18 that, in general, the likelihood of union
success declines as employee turnout increases.
Table 20 reports further information on turnout, this time related
to union vote loss, which is the difference between union support
demonstrated by authorization cards signed and the support shown at
the election.
Table 20 shows that in the few elections with the lowest voter turnout-
under 60%--unions actually gained support during this period. Turn-
out proportions between 60% and 80% have an irregular impact upon
vote loss. The most interesting result reported in Table 20 is that while
vote loss remains essentially constant at turnouts between 80% and 95%
(a vote loss of between 5.7% and 6.9%), vote loss climbs sharply to a
mean of 15.1% when turnout exceeds 95%. Table 20 reports a signifi-
cant relationship between turnout and vote loss.
TABLE 20
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO EMPLOYEE TURNOUT
Turnout N Mean Vote Standard
Elections Loss Deviation
Under 50% 3 - 5.1 %* 8.9%
50-60% 2 -30.0 %* 42.4%
60-70% 14 12.1 % 32.5%
70-75% 20 26.2 % 41.4%
75-80% 16 13.8 % 17.5%
80-85% 22 5.7 % 29.2%
85-90% 71 5.9 % 29.0%
90-95% 78 6.9 % 22.1%
95%+ 418 15.1 % 27.0%
All Elections 644 12.8 % 27.6%
Significance = .003
A negative vote loss indicates a gain in union support.
Union Election Outcome
To summarize the data on the impact of turnout on pro-union vot-
ing, Tables 18 and 20 show that turnout has a statistically significant
influence. Table 19, while not statistically significant, displays a pat-
tern that supports that conclusion. The data show that union support
and the likelihood of union success in the election decline with in-
creased voter turnout and that unions do worst in elections with ex-
tremely high turnouts, which comprise the vast majority of elections.
The data collected provide no basis for determining the reason that
increased turnout adversely affects union success, but one can speculate
that, in general, union advocates are more highly motivated to express
their position by voting than are employees who are satisfied with the
status quo. Where turnout is large, a larger proportion of the employ-
ees who are generally more passive and pro-employer are voting.
A final question addressed in the study was the possible impact of
the day of the week of the election on election outcome and level of
union support. Such an inquiry was included in the study in response
to a published report of a question session at a conference following a
speech by former NLRB Chairman John Fanning at which Steelwork-
ers Organizing Director John Oshinski reported that a survey of Steel-
workers elections had shown that most elections are scheduled on
Thursdays and Fridays when unions have the least chance of
success. 143
Table 21 reports the findings in Region Eighteen on the relation-
ship between the day of the week on which the NLRB election was
conducted and the outcome of the election. Table 21 shows that more
than a third of all NLRB elections are held on a Friday and more than
60% of elections are held on either a Thursday or a Friday. Putting
aside the extremely infrequent Saturday elections, the Board was least
likely to hold elections on Mondays, when the unions won 53.7% of the
time, and most likely to hold them on Fridays, when unions won only
42.7% of the elections. The reasons for the "Friday factor" are some-
what difficult to ascertain. It may be a reflection of the greater degree
of access that employers have to employees; a Friday election comes at
the end of a week in which an employer has had an opportunity to
speak directly to its employees each day. It could be instead that em-
ployees have generally more positive attitudes about their workplace
and a tendency to vote against a union when they are looking ahead to
weekend leisure time. Fridays may be more likely to be paydays,
which might reinforce a positive view of the employer and emphasize
to employees their economic dependence upon the employer. The
143 Union Organizing Campaigns and Women, 106 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 114, 116 (1981). Oshinski
told Chairman Fanning that the Steelworkers won 80% of elections on Mondays, 70% on Tues-
days, 50% on Wednesdays, 43% on Thursdays, and 45% on Fridays. Chairman Fanning replied
that Oshinski's study was "very interesting" and promised to pass the observations along to his
colleagues at the NLRB. Id
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TABLE 21
ELECTION OUTCOME AND TURNOUT IN RELATIONSHIP
TO DAY OF WEEK
Day of
Week N % Mean
Elections Elections Turnout % Union Won
Monday 67 8.9% 89.3% 53.7%
Tuesday 100 13.2% 86.6% 53.0%
Wednesday 127 16.8% 89.4% 54.4%
Thursday 187 24.8% 87.6% 49.2%
Friday 267 35.4% 88.6% 42.7%
Saturday 7 .9% 88.2% 28.6%
All Elections 755 100.0% 88.3% 48.5%
Significance (Turnout) = .68
Significance (Outcome) = .14
greater success of employers in Friday elections could simply mean
that employers savvy enough to use their influence in a settlement to
get elections scheduled for Fridays are also savvy enough to conduct
effective election campaigns or to manage employee relations so well
that a union is of little appeal.
Table 22 aggregates the data from Table 21 by half-weeks. Table
22 shows that unions are significantly more likely to win an election
held early in the week when the NLRB is least likely to schedule the
election. Unions won 53.7% of elections conducted Mondays through
Wednesdays, but only 45.1% of the elections conducted Thursdays
through Saturdays.
TABLE 22
ELECTION OUTCOME IN RELATIONSHIP TO PART OF
WEEK
Time of Week, N % %
by Part of Week Elections Elections Union Won
Monday-Wednesday 294 38.9% 53.7%
Thursday-Saturday 461 61.1% 45.1%
All Elections 755 100.0% 48.5%
Significance = .02
Union Election Outcome
With such a startling difference in outcome related to weekday it
seems appropriate to inquire why the NLRB disproportionately sched-
ules elections toward the end of the week. In more than eighty percent
of the cases, the parties determined the date of the election by a consent
or stipulation agreement. Such agreements outline not only the elec-
tion date, but also the bargaining unit and other factors. 144 It has been
suggested that unions are unable to influence the scheduling of elec-
tions effectively because employers are willing to condition their agree-
ment to a consent election upon setting an election date in the latter
part of the week.145 Unions, seeking to avoid the delays that a formal
hearing would cause, feel compelled to accede to the employer's de-
mand for an election late in the week. As to the remaining election
dates that are set by the regional directors, one explanation sometimes
given for elections held later in the week is that turnout is thought to be
greater then and that scheduling elections to maximize turnout is con-
sistent with the role of the NLRB to increase employee free choice in
deciding whether to have a collective bargaining representative.146 Ta-
ble 21, however, indicates that turnout is not in fact greater in the latter
part of the week and that turnout is actually higher on Mondays, when
the NLRB rarely holds elections, than on Fridays, when elections are
most commonly held.
The impact upon voting behavior of the day of the week on which
the election is held can also be measured by examining the extent to
which the voting reflects a loss in the support earlier garnered by the
union through signatures on authorization cards. Table 23 presents the
correlation between weekday and vote loss. Measured by vote loss,
probably a better measure of impact upon voters than election out-
come, there is no significant difference among weekdays. Looking only
at vote loss, there is no pattern, such as that in Tables 21 and 22, sug-
gesting that unions lose support as the week progresses.
The foregoing analysis of the data has considered the relationship
between a single response (for example, outcome) and a single predic-
tor (for example, unit size). Regression methods permit studying the
effects of several variables simultaneously upon a response. To use
these methods properly, only the 567 elections for which all variables
are recorded are considered. The following predictor variables were
144 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. A recent survey of employers in 52 elections
correlating employer perceptions of their degree of success in influencing election date and unit
composition concluded that both types of employer influence are positively correlated with em-
ployer success in the election. Murrmann & Porter, supra note 139, at 70-71.
145 Union Organizing Campaigns and Women, 106 Lab. Rel. Rep. at 114, 116 (1981) (statement
of John Oshinski); Letter from John L. Oshinski to Laura Cooper (March 13, 1981).
146 The NLRB advises its staff engaged in determining election dates to take into account the
"desirability of facilitating employee participation" and directs that, where there is a choice, dates
of likely high absenteeism should be avoided. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, CASE HAN-
DLING MANUAL (PART Two), REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS 11302.1 (1975).
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TABLE 23
VOTE Loss IN RELATIONSHIP TO DAY OF WEEK
Day of
Week N Mean Vote Standard
Elections Loss Deviation
Monday 63 12.6% 31.0%
Tuesday 94 17.1% 29.2%
Wednesday 111 12.5% 28.0%
Thursday 159 11.6% 26.3%
Friday 236 13.9% 26.9%
Saturday 5 4.2% 16.9%
All Elections 668 13.4% 27.6%
Significance = .67
considered: turnout, proportion of authorization cards, presence of an
unfair labor practice charge, presence of an unfair labor practice find-
ing, age of authorization cards at the time of the election, size of the
bargaining unit, day of the week of the election, type of bargaining
unit, and type of industry. 47 The response variables considered were
election outcome, percent of vote the union obtained, and vote loss
(percent of authorization cards compared with percent of vote for the
union).
The response variables of outcome and percent vote were analyzed
using the method of linear logistic regression. 48 Usual multiple linear
regression was used to study predictors of vote loss.' 49 The two tech-
niques are very similar in the way that they model response, but they
use quite different methods for obtaining the estimates that appear in
the resulting models.1 50
147 The variable of company representation was initially considered in the regression analysis,
but was found not to have any effect and so is not included in the results reported here.
148 C. MORRIS & J. ROLPH, INTRODUCTION TO DATA ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE
ch. 8 (1981).
149 S. WEISBERG, APPLIED LINEAR REGRESSION chs. 2, 7, 8 (1980).
150 For linear regression, for example, we might fit a model like:
Vote Loss = b0 + b, (proportion cards) + b2 (turnout) + other terms, where the "other
terms" are also additive effects of other variables in the study. The b's are estimated using
least squares analysis. Linear logistic regression leads to a similar equation, except that the
appropriate response in the case of election outcome is the logarithm of the odds of success
versus failure. A typical model might be log (odds of union success) = c0 + cl (proportion
cards) + c2 (turnout) + other terms. For logistic regression, the 's are estimated using maxi-
mum likelihood methods that take account of the binomial variation in counted data. For
either method, large values of the b's and e's (either positive or negative) correspond to useful
predictors of the response. For linear regression, familiar t and F tests are available to judge
the sizes of the b's either individually or in groups. In logistic regression, with the large
sample available in this study, approximate t- tests and likelihood ratio or G 2 tests are avail-
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TABLE 24
ODDS OF UNION SUCCESS ON DIFFERENT DAYS OF THE
WEEK
Ignoring Other Adjusted for
Factors Other Factors
Day of Estimated Odds of Odds of
Week Coefficient Success Success
Monday .41 1.50 to 1 1.51 to 1
Tuesday .33 1.40 to 1 1.17 to I
Wednesday .33 1.40 to 1 1.41 to 1
Thursday .18 1.20 to 1 1.38 to 1
Friday -.19 0.82 to 1 1.00 to 1
Test for equality of odds ignoring other factors is G2=8.15, df=4, signifi-
cance = .086
Test for equality of odds adjusting for other factors is G2=3.13, df=4, sig-
nificance = .54
Applying logistic regression to the response variable of outcome,
beginning with the day of the week as a predictor, produces the results
set out in Table 24. This table was generated by fitting the logistic
model to explain log (odds of union success) as a linear function of
indicator variables for the five weekdays. There is mild evidence that
these five differ. The next column converts these estimates to odds.
The odds of union success on Mondays are estimated at 1.5 to 1, while
the odds on Fridays fall to .82 to 1. If we compare Monday through
Thursday against Friday elections, we find the odds of success for the
first four days of the week to be 1.31 to 1, while for Friday elections, the
union's odds are only .84 to 1. These results show a significant differ-
ence between Friday and non-Friday elections. The last column of Ta-
ble 24 provides the fitted odds for the five weekdays, when the
coefficients are estimated from a model that includes several other
able to give the same information. For either, t-statistics roughly greater than 2 in absolute
value correspond to a significance level of .05 for that variable.
In linear regression, a coefficient estimate is interpreted as the rate of change in the
response when one and only one of the predictors is varied. For example, in a model includ-
ing unit size, the b estimated corresponding to unit size gives the amount of change in the
response for every additional person added to the unit, assuming that all other variables are
fixed at their current value. For logistic regression, a somewhat more complicated interpreta-
tion for the 's is available because of the logarithm in the equation. For these models, the 's
correspond to changes in the log odds of union success; e's bigger than 0 correspond to in-
creasing the odds of success, while e's less than 0 correspond to decreasing the odds of suc-
cess. Since we have used natural logarithms, if we change a predictor by an amount, say d,
and if c is the coefficient estimated for that predictor, wemultiply the odds of union success by
exp(cd).
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TABLE 25






Signed Cards 3.48 6.92
Age of Cards (Days) -0.0062 -2.38
Unit Size -0.0021 -1.30
Friday Election -0.29 -1.51
predictors, notably turnout, percent cards, age of cards, and unit size.
Adjusting for these other factors makes the differences between days
smaller. In particular, the fitted odds for Friday increase to 1 to 1. The
results reported in the last column of Table 24 suggest that if the day of
the week has an effect on outcome, it is that Friday elections slightly
reduce the union's chances of success as compared with other days and
that much of the "Friday factor" can be explained by other variables.
Table 25 provides the result of a fitted logistic regression including
those factors that appeared most important in determining outcome:
turnout, percent cards, age of cards, size of unit, and whether the elec-
tion took place on a Friday. The other predictors listed above, includ-
ing type of bargaining unit, type of industry, and presence of unfair
labor practices have essentially no predictive power on outcome. The
fitted coefficients and corresponding approximate t statistics are given
in the table. The small t statistics for the "Friday factor" and for size of
the unit show that their effects were only marginal. The fitted coeffi-
cients presented in Table 25 can be explained as follows: If all other
factors are held constant, but turnout is increased by 10%, the odds of
the union winning the election are multiplied by .80. Thus, increasing
turnout hurts the union's chance of success. Similarly, for every 10%
increase in cards submitted, the odds of the union winning are multi-
plied by 1.42, so the greater the union's proportion of cards, the better
the union's odds of success. A ten-day increase in the average age of
the authorization cards multiplies the odds by .94. Increasing the unit
size by ten people multiplies the odds by .98. Holding the election on a
Friday rather than another day multiplies the odds of union success by
.75.
Not surprisingly, applying a logistic regression analysis to the re-
Union Election Outcome
sponse variable of percentage of vote for the union yields results that
are qualitatively the same as the results for the outcome response re-
ported in Table 25. Table 26 summarizes the fitted logistic regression
model including the same five predictors used in Table 25 for outcome.
Again, the predictors excluded from the table were not important. As
with outcome, the most clearly important predictor of vote for the
union is the percentage of cards submitted. Unions with higher pro-
portions of cards obtained higher proportions of votes. Turnout has a
slight negative effect and the other three predictors that had a marginal
effect in predicting outcome are even less useful in predicting the per-
cent of the union vote.
TABLE 26







Signed Cards 2.67 5.63
Age of Cards (Days) -0.0011 -0.76
Unit Size -0.0010 -0.80
Friday Election -0.064 -0.35
Finally, applying linear regression analysis to the response varia-
ble of vote loss produced results qualitatively similar to those for the
overall outcome. As seen in Table 27, the major predictors of vote loss
were turnout, percent cards, age of cards and size of the unit. Day of
the week had no apparent effect on vote loss. All of the useful
predictors had positive coefficients, indicating that as these increase, so
does vote loss. It is only to be expected that vote loss would increase
with the percentage of authorization cards since vote loss can only be
large if the percentage of employees signing cards is also large. The
effect of proportion of cards on vote loss noted in Table 27 may be
simply a reflection of the chosen measure for change in employee sup-
port for the union. The R 2 for Table 27 was only .15, indicating that
only a small part of the variation in vote loss is successfully modeled by
the predictors. Whatever causes employees who signed cards to vote
against the union largely is not modeled by these few variables measur-
ing the characteristics of the election.
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TABLE 27






Signed Cards 0.40 8.30
Age of Cards (Days) 0.00027 1.67
Unit Size 0.00024 1.84
Friday Election 0.015 0.74
Residual Mean Square = .050, df = 561, R2 = .15
In summary, the regression analysis produced results consistent
with the correlations presented earlier. Of all the factors considered in
the study, authorization cards are the best predictor of election results,
but authorization cards alone, or with other factors, only predict a very
small part of the variation in election outcome. There is, on the aver-
age, a substantial loss in support for unions from the time of card sign-
ing to the date of the election. Even a union that collects cards from all
or nearly all employees has a significant chance of losing the election.
Next to authorization cards, election turnout was the best predictor of
outcome, with a union's chance of success dropping as turnout in-
creased. The only additional factors that have a demonstrable, al-
though smaller, impact on election results were bargaining unit size,
length of time from card signing to election, and weekday on which the
election was held. The larger the bargaining unit, the smaller was the
union's chance of success. Delay between card signing and the election
also decreased the union's chance of success. Holding elections on a
Friday, rather than another day of the week, lessened the likelihood of
a union victory. Noticeably absent from this list of factors that influ-
ence the outcome of representation elections is the commission of em-
ployer unfair labor practices. There is no evidence that employer unfair
labor practices adversely affect the union success rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This study was designed to test empirically the validity of the
NLRB's assumption underlying its Gissel doctrine, that if a union ob-
tains authorization cards from a majority of employees, it is reasonably
likely to win a representation election in the absence of employer un-
fair labor practices. In the process of gathering and analyzing data to
Union Election Outcome
test this assumption, other results were obtained that provide a basis to
question other NLRB policies regarding representation elections.
Looking first at the assumption underlying the Gissel policy, the
data here show that unions with authorization cards from a bare major-
ity of employees are substantially more likely to lose, than to win, an
election. Only when a union's authorization card support reaches
62.5% does it have as much as an even chance of winning. These facts
seriously undermine the factual assumption underlying Gissel and
should warrant a reconsideration of that policy. Gisse's bargaining or-
der remedy is designed to effectuate employee free choice, rather than
just to deter employer misconduct.' 5' Thus, permitting a union with
authorization card support from only a bare majority of employees to
become the employees' exclusive bargaining representative fails to ef-
fectuate the sentiments of those employees about unionization that they
probably would express if they were allowed to participate in a secret
ballot election. If the Board indeed is interested in issuing bargaining
orders in cases in which unions would have won the election, then the
Board might require authorization cards from substantially more than
a majority of the employees-perhaps the 62.5% figure found here-to
better gauge when a union has at least an even chance of winning. 52
In the alternative, the Board could attempt to improve the reliability of
authorization cards as a predictor of election outcome by standardizing
their content and requiring a simple verbal explanation to be given to
employees requested to sign cards. 53 Each of these alternative modifi-
cations of the Gissel doctrine would make it somewhat more burden-
some, as a practical matter, for unions to obtain NLRB elections. In
view of the relative unreliability of current organizing methods, how-
ever, encouraging unions to establish more solid support among em-
ployees before seeking a Board election may have a salutary effect on
the success of organizing efforts.
Certainly any reconsideration of the Gissel policy must take into
account not only the results of this and other empirical studies, but also
151 The Supreme Court said in Gissel that "[A] bargaining order is designed as much to remedy
past election damage as it is to deter future misconduct." NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
at 612 (footnote omitted).
152 Increasing the percentage of cards required for a Gissel bargaining order would likely have
the practical effect of causing unions to engage in more organizing activities before seeking an
election in order to make a bargaining order available should serious unfair labor practices follow.
153 For example, the NLRB might require that authorization cards state: "I hereby authorize
this union to represent me for purposes of collective bargaining with my employer. I understand
that this card will probably be presented only to the NLRB in order to get an election. I have
been informed, however, that if my employer should commit serious unfair labor practices, the
NLRB may use this card, among others, as a basis for ordering my employer to bargain with this
union as my exclusive representative for collective bargaining even though no election is ever held
or an election is held which the union loses." The Board could also require that employees who
are asked to sign cards are given a verbal statement of the same information, much as police
officers provide Miranda warnings to those they arrest.
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other costs and benefits that might result from a change in policy. If,
for example, the existing doctrine has an effect of deterring the commis-
sion of serious employer unfair labor practices, then an effort would
have to be made to provide an alternative, at least equally effective,
deterrent. 54 If making it more difficult for unions to secure authoriza-
tion cards would jeopardize employee free choice or would upset, in
favor of management, the balance of power established by current
Board policies, then other policy changes should be made to improve
exercise of employee rights and unions' chances for election success.
One such method would be to enhance unions' ability to communicate
with employees in an election campaign. 55 Any cost-benefit analysis
of the proposed modifications of the Gissel doctrine must also take into
account that the objectives of deterrence and effectuation of employee
free choice that underlie the current policy both are undermined seri-
ously by employers' knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood
that NLRB bargaining orders will be denied enforcement in the courts
154 For example, the Board might attempt increased use of its discretionary authority to seek
injunctions against unfair labor practices committed during election campaigns. See supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text. Or, Congress might amend the statute to mandate such injunctions
or provide stiffer penalties for the commission of unfair labor practices during an election cam-
paign. For example, sections 8 and 10 of the Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 123 CONG. REC. 273711-14, would have, respectively, provided double back pay for em-
ployees discharged unlawfully during an organizing campaign or prior to an initial collective bar-
gaining agreement and required the Board to seek injunctions to remedy unlawful discharges
committed during this same period. The Act passed in the House but was never voted on in the
Senate. In a more substantial amendment, Congress might eliminate the requirement of section
10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982), that Board remedies be in the nature of "affirmative
action" only and permit the Board to adopt overtly punitive monetary penalties against employers
that commit serious and pervasive unfair labor practices. In interpreting the existing section 10(c)
of the Act, the Supreme Court has said that "the power to command affirmative action is reme-
dial, not punitive." Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940). In permitting the
Board to assess monetary penalties, Congress would be acknowledging that employers' primary
motivation for unlawful efforts to defeat unionization is economic and therefore economic sanc-
tions might be the most effective deterrent. NLRB awards of punitive damages were advocated in
Note, NLRB Power to Award Damages in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1670,
1679-83 (1971).
155 See supra note 12 describing the present policies regarding union access to employees and
the imbalance that they create between employer and union opportunities to communicate with
employees. The Board or Congress might permit unions to address employees on company time if
employers do so or otherwise increase unions' opportunity for communicating with employees.
Section 3 of the unenacted Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 CONG.
REC. 273711-14, would have required the Board to issue regulations that would have given unions
equal opportunity to address employees during working time and would have assured employees
"an equal opportunity overall to obtain ... information from the employer and [the] labor organ-
ization." Giving union organizers equal access to employees would also require overruling NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), in which the Supreme Court held that, under most
circumstances, the Act does not permit the NLRB to allow nonemployee organizers on company
property. Implementing such changes to permit unions equivalent opportunities for communica-
tion was a central recommendation of the empirical study of union elections conducted by
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman. J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 156-59.
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of appeals.1 56 Modifying the Gissel doctrine to conform to more accu-
rate factual assumptions of employee card signing and voting behavior
should increase judicial enforcement of bargaining orders, and thereby
enhance the ability of the doctrine to achieve its objectives. 57
While the results of this study concerning the reliability of authori-
zation cards provide a substantial reason for reassessing the policy of
awarding bargaining rights to unions that possess support from a bare
majority of employees, the results concerning the lack of impact of em-
ployer unfair labor practices suggest a basic problem in the Board's
policy of setting aside all victories won by an employer who has com-
mitted an unfair labor practice during the campaign.158 Underlying the
latter policy is the assumption that employer unfair labor practices
committed during a campaign decrease employee support for the
union. This study found no evidence to support such an assumption.
Correlations presented here revealed no significant difference in elec-
tion outcomes or in union vote loss between clean elections and elec-
tions with unfair labor practices. In none of the regression analyses did
unfair labor practices appear to have even the slightest influence upon
the percentage of union vote, union vote loss, or election outcome. The
156 See supra text accompanying notes 78-9 1.
157 Any reassessment of Gissel should also include an empirical evaluation of the impact of
those bargaining orders that are implemented. An employer ordered to bargain under Girsel com-
mences bargaining with the knowledge that, in the view of the Board, the union with which it is
ordered to bargain does not presently possess the support of the majority of employees. Since the
ability of a union to obtain a collective bargaining agreement is, in significant part, dependent on
the employer's assessment of the union's level of support among employees, it would be expected
that many Gissel bargaining orders would not, in fact, result in a collective bargaining agreement.
An empirical study of 59 bargaining orders issued in cases involving employer unfair labor prac-
tices under the Board's pre-GisselJoy Silk doctrine found that contracts were reached in 49% of
the cases. Wolkinson, The RemedialEfficacy of NLRB Remedies in Joy Silk Cases, 55 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 1, 8 n.23 (1969). Where employers exercised their right to obtain judicial review in the courts
of appeals, contracts were reached in less than a third of the cases. Id at 11. Another study of
more than 2,600 cases of union bargaining rights obtained through elections determined that ini-
tial contracts were obtained with the employer in more than 77% of the cases. Prosten, The Rise in
NLRB Election Delays: Measuring Business' New Resistance, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 38, 40 (Feb.
1979). More recent information regarding the efficacy of Gissel bargaining orders is available.
Professor Weiler reports on an unpublished thesis which studied 38 Gissel bargaining cases and
found that initial contracts were reached in 14 or 37% of the cases. In assessing the limited data
regarding the attainment of a subsequent contract, Weiler concluded that "a Gisel order has less
than a 10% chance of producing a lasting collective bargaining relationship." Weiler, supra note
104, at 1795 n.94. Additional data are available in a study reported to the National Organizing
Committee of the AFL-CIO. The study reported on a group of 40 cases, 90% of which were Gissel
bargaining order cases and the remainder of which were cases of bargaining orders resulting from
surface bargaining following a successful election. Of the 40 cases, I I or 28% resulted in a con-
tract. By comparison, the same report included a study of 271 successful elections in units of over
100 employees during 1979-1981. Initial contracts were obtained in 63% of the cases. Following
expiration of the first contract, second contracts were secured in 56% of the election cases. Memo-
randum from Charles McDonald to AFL-CIO National Organizing Committee (Feb. 18, 1983).
158 See supra note 21.
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only evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the
commission of unfair labor practices and voting behavior, reported in
Table 8, showed that, in close elections, unions actually gained support
when employers engaged in unlawful conduct. The results here sub-
stantially replicate the conclusions of the Getman, Goldberg, and Her-
man study of election behavior, which found that unions "did not lose
significantly more support in unlawful elections than in clean elec-
tions,"' 159 and that employees "who intended to vote union were more
likely to report unlawful campaign tactics than employees who in-
tended to vote company."' 60 If these studies are correct in finding no
evidence that unlawful employer conduct causes unions to lose support,
then the Board, while retaining other remedies for specific employer
unfair labor practices, need not automatically set aside the results of
elections in which such conduct occurs.' 6' Again, if abandoning the
remedy for employer unfair labor practices of setting elections aside
decreases deterrence, the Board should be authorized to seek imposi-
tion of harsher penalties, including fines, upon employers. 62
While this study found no evidence that unfair labor practices de-
crease union support, it does not go so far as to show that in cases of
outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices, where Gissel would
permit a bargaining order, unfair labor practices have no impact. In
none of the elections considered in this study did the unfair labor prac-
tices rise to such a level as to warrant a Gissel bargaining order. 63
Since the data for this study were limited to cases in which elections
were actually conducted, it was not possible to evaluate the possible
impact of unfair labor practices that are so serious or begin so early
that an election petition is never filed, or one that is fied is later with-
159 J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 128. Note, however, that other scholors have disputed
whether the data of the Getman study supports this conclusion. See supra note 104. Other re-
searchers have found a correlation between union losses and employer unfair labor practices. See
Dickens, supra note 104, at 560.
160 J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 129.
161 For example, in an election campaign won by the employer, in which the employer dis-
charged employees for their union activities, the employer's conduct should be found to be an
unfair labor practice. The employees subject to the discrimination should be provided back pay
and offered reinstatement, preferably through a prompt injunction, but the election need not be set
aside.
162 Sce supra note 154. The Getman study recommended remedies including injunctive relief
to obtain reinstatement of discharged employees, treble damages for lost earnings and loss of
government contracts. J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 161.
163 Of the thirty-one elections included in the Getman research, in nine cases the administra-
tive law judge who consulted with the researchers concluded that bargaining orders would have
been warranted if the union had had a majority of authorization cards and had lost the election. J.
GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, at 113. In only two of these nine elections did the union actually
have a card majority and then lose the election. Id at 113 n.2. The Getman study found that in
no group of potential union voters did a significantly greater proportion vote against union repre-
sentation in bargaining order elections than in clean elections. Id at 115.
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drawn because of the union's devastation through such practices.' 64
While the data show no adverse impact of ordinary unfair labor prac-
tices upon union support, this study provides no direct evidence on the
question of whether- Gissel bargaining orders are necessary to remedy
losses of union support that might be caused by the most serious unfair
labor practices.
Two other factors, found by this study to have signifcant impacts
upon election results, do have implications for changes in NLRB poli-
cies. The finding that procedural delays following the union's election
petition have an adverse impact upon union success, a conclusion that
other studies have reached as well,165 suggests that the NLRB and Con-
gress should make further efforts to expedite pre-election proceed-
ings.' 66 Finally, the findings that union success is significantly impaired
by conducting elections on Fridays167 and that the Board holds more
elections on Fridays than any other day, warrants a change in Board
policy concerning the setting of election dates. For the approximately
twenty percent of elections in which the election date is determined,
after a hearing, by the regional director, the day of the week for the
election should be selected randomly. As to those elections in which
the parties set the date by agreement, over which employers often have
effective control, the Board should consider permitting the parties to
agree only upon a week for the election and having the Board set the
weekday for the election by a random process.
164 The J. GETMAN STUDY, supra note 12, also had this limitation. It might be very difficult to
identify and study workplaces in which election petitions were never filed or later withdrawn
because of serious and pervasive unfair labor practices.
165 See supra note 137 and Prosten, supra note 157, at 38, 39.
166 Expedition might be achieved by increasing the size of the NLRB staff available to handle
election investigations. Statutory amendments could also decrease delays. Current law gives em-
ployers an absolute right to a hearing prior to scheduling an election, provided that the question of
representation would affect commerce, even if no showing has been made that there are any issues
to be considered at the hearing. NLRA, § 9(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982). A congressional
report noted that the median period between a petition and an election is 45 days, but that when a
hearing is requested the median time is 75 days. HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LAAno, THE
LA3OR REFORM ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 95-637, 95th Cong., st Sess. 5 (1977).
167 The absence of a clear explanation for the impact of the "Friday factor" does not under-
mine the suggestion that election days be randomized since the recommended change appears to
be essentially cost-free and to threaten no other established policies.
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